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**“The initial period of the war in the documents of military counterintelligence  
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# **Трагедия 1941**

**Причины катастрофы**

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**Mikhail Ivanovich MELTYUKHOV**

**The initial period of the war in the documents of military counterintelligence (June 22 -  
July 9, 1941)**

The study of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945. continues to be an urgent task of Russian historical science. The declassification of previously inaccessible funds of military archives makes it possible to introduce into scientific circulation previously unknown materials about the events of the beginning of the war. Of great importance for these studies, along with other sources, are documents of political agencies and military counterintelligence, reflecting the situation in the Army.

Since December 1918, counterintelligence in the Red Army was carried out by the Special Departments of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD. However, on February 8, 1941, in accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 278-131ss "On the transfer of the Special Department from the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy", the Third Directorates were created as part of the NPO and the NKVMF, and in NKVD - Third Department, engaged in counterintelligence work [State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. R 5446. Op. Zas. D. 3. L. 114 - 119. Partially published: 1941. Documentation. Book. 1. S. 598 - 600.]. However, during the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War on July 17, 1941, in accordance with the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the Third Directorate of the NPO was again reorganized into the Directorate of the Special Department [1941. Documentation. Book. 2. S. 473 - 474.].

Of course, military counterintelligence materials, as a historical source, have a number of features. First of all, it should be noted their criticality to the described

events. Aimed at identifying and summarizing negative facts and phenomena, the military counterintelligence agencies performed the function of a supervisory control apparatus in the Army. Naturally, it was the negative phenomena that were most reflected in these documents. At the same time, these documents provide an opportunity to feel the main trends in the perception of the events that took place by their contemporaries. The following excerpts from military counterintelligence documents show the main problems that Soviet troops faced in the first weeks of the war with Germany.

For ease of perception, these materials are grouped into the following thematic sections. The first selection is devoted to problems in the Soviet Air Force, then a selection of information on the ground forces of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts for the initial period of the war is given, although some of these documents were compiled much later than the events described. Of course, the materials presented do not give a coherent picture of events, but rather a mosaic of individual episodes, the description of which should also not be taken as the ultimate truth. Like any historical source, these documents require a critical attitude, but at the same time they are a necessary part of a comprehensive understanding of the causes of the tragedy of 1941.

\* \* \*

At 3:15 am on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. In an effort to seize air supremacy, the German Luftwaffe launched airstrikes on Soviet airfields, headquarters, communications centers and large settlements. Accordingly, the Soviet Air Force was forced to engage in combat under the conditions of a surprise attack. As a result, in addition to the complexities of the combat situation in the first days of the war, a number of problems were added related to the logistic support of aviation and the organization of its combat work.

The most important problem **of the Air Force of the Red Army** was the heavy loss of aircraft. Thus, according to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 35134 dated June 25, on the North-Western Front "our aviation suffers heavy losses: there were 880 aircraft, about 500 remained in service since June 24. Aircraft were out of action mainly at airfields, according to due to their crowded accommodation, the lack of the required number of alternate airfields, sites "[Russian State Military Archive. F. 9. Op. 39. D. 98. L. 163.].

On June 25, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO sent a copy of special communication No. 2/35064 to the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, which stated that "the leadership is vague and soft. The mood at the headquarters of the PribOVO district is nervous, on the part of a number of senior officials there is uncertainty about the situation that has been created.

As of June 24, On average, 10-20 aircraft remained from each PribOVO aviation regiment. The entire 7th Air Division has about 60 aircraft, the motor resources of the "SB" units are on average below 50%, the aviation ammunition will last for 1 - 2 days only until June 26th. According to the promised line, the transportation of aviation ammunition from Estonia is not provided due to the lack of transport. Due to the withdrawal of units, there is a shortage of airfields, since airfields were mainly built in southwestern places Lithuanian and Latvian republics with the calculation of the offensive.

The real leadership of the Air Force units is not provided by the Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Major General of Aviation Andreev and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Rasskazov, due to the lack of communication with some units and the command post of the front, they feel the lack of leadership and lack of command from the front, they themselves did not organize proper measures to bomb the enemy .

The planes are sitting on their airfields, as a result of heavy losses on the ground, due to the lack of organization of an exit from the enemy's strike" [Ibid. L. 263 - 264.].

According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 2/35552 dated June 28, 1941: "The main losses [of the 7th air division] relate to the 46th SBAP and are explained by disorganization and confusion on the part of the regiment commander, Major Senko, and the chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Kanunov, which, during the first enemy raid, caused the entire personnel to panic.

On June 22, the 46th SBAP lost 20 aircraft, of which 10 were destroyed during an enemy raid on the Siauliai airfield, and the rest were shot down during combat missions to bombard enemy troops in the Tilsit area and st. Killen.

Three nine aircraft of the 46th SBAP were released to perform combat missions without escort of their fighters. The observation posts were not organized, the headquarters of the regiment had no connection with them and did not know about their existence" [Ibid. L. 272.].

In addition, it turned out that not all important points were covered by air defense. For example, on June 27, 1941, the head of the 2nd department of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, Brigadier Commissar Avseevich reported:

"The defense of the objects of the Dvina [Daugavpils] garrison is not provided; railway junctions, bridges and warehouses are not covered by anti-aircraft points and remain vulnerable to enemy aircraft.

The remaining fighter squadron of the 49th Aviation Regiment, provide security objects from enemy raids are not able to.

The enemy shows exceptional attention to the destruction of bridges, seeking interrupt the sources of support for the Dvina garrison with its subsequent encirclement.

VNOS posts do not work well, they confuse the transmission of signals to the command post, which is why on June 22 this year. the flight crew of the regiment stationed at the Rendene airfield took off six times on a false alarm, and in the event of a real enemy attack, our fighters, being not warned, took to the air when the enemy was already bombarding the outskirts of the city.

The personnel of the air defense units of Dvinsk [Daugavpils] do not know the types of our aircraft and, despite the good visibility of the identification marks, subject them to fire, so on June 22 of this year. 6 "SB" planes left the Lithuanian airfields from under the enemy's attack through Dvinsk and were subjected to shelling, which accidentally did not end in casualties. [...]

The air defense of the Velikoluksky airfield is the same, where there are no anti-aircraft weapons and fighter aircraft, although this airfield is a hub for transport aircraft.

The lack of air defense means of the airfield makes it possible for enemy aircraft to appear over the city with impunity, which took place on June 25, 1941. [Ibid. L. 133 - 134].

According to the memorandum No. 03 dated June 28 of the head of the 3rd department of the Northwestern Front, divisional commissar Babich, "the aviation units of the Air Force of the front, due to the incapacitation of all airfields in Lithuania and most of Latvia, were relocated to various points in the airfields of the Pskov hub, however, As of June 28, by 11:00, communications with the air regiments, the offices of the 8th, 7th and 57th air divisions have not been established and nothing is known about their actions. Communication is maintained only with the 6th air division - mountains. Riga, part of which operates in the Riga area and in the directions of the 8th Army. The number of combat aircraft in the Air Force, due to heavy losses at airfields, is 150-160 aircraft, of which about 100 are fighters. The lack of communication does not allow these aircraft to be concentrated into a fighting fist, and they are scattered. Separate regiments have 6-10 aircraft each.

Some commanders of air regiments and air divisions, without receiving orders from the front, move from place to place on their own (the 7th air division and the 54th SBAP), and this further confuses the issuance of combat orders to them.

From the very beginning of hostilities, the commander of the 7th Air Division, Colonel Petrov, organized all sorties at his own discretion, he did not properly direct combat operations from the very beginning. On June 19, Petrov was warned by the deputy commander of the Air Force for political work about possible military operations; he was given a deadline for completion by 3 o'clock on June 22 of this year. Petrov reacted extremely negligently to this instruction. I did not demand that the regimental commanders comply with this instruction, and the regiments were actually taken by surprise by the enemy, as a result of which there were heavy losses of aircraft at the airfields.

The commander of the 54th SBAP, Major Skiba, does not manage combat missions well, he does not happen at airfields, he gives orders from the dugout, without any data: "Go bomb - you will find the target yourself."

To the remark that without data on the enemy it is possible to bomb our own, Skiba replied: "I don't know anything." On the first day of the war, he gave the order to raise the 3rd squadron and wait for further orders in the air. The squadron, armed with Ar-2 aircraft and four SB aircraft, was waiting for orders in the air for 1.5 hours, as a result of which it could not complete the combat mission, since it could only be in flight for 3-4 hours. The Ar-2 planes were forced to land on their airfield with bombs, and the SB flight, which flew out on a combat mission, completely died after 1.5 hours in the air.

Major Ivanov's squadron, being prepared for night flights, was not used at night, and when Ivanov turned to Skiba on this issue to fly only at night, Skiba replied: "There is no such order."

Skiba himself did not fly out on a combat mission, and the plane attached to it handed over to another pilot, his assistant, Major Leontiev, did the same.

Before basing from one airfield to another, Skiba, having the opportunity to take out valuable military equipment, threw it or destroyed it.

On this fact, an investigation is being carried out with a view to putting Major Skiba on trial" [Ibid. D. 103. L. 86 - 87.].

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 37738 dated July 14, 1941, "the remaining minimum number of fighter aircraft of the Air Force of the North-Western Front is inactive due to the lack of compressed air to start the engines.

Bombers sent to destroy enemy manpower without fighter cover suffer heavy losses of both materiel and airlift

composition.

July 7 this year to destroy enemy troops in the mountains. 17 SB planes of the 7th Air Division took off from the island without fighter cover, and none of them returned to their base.

In total, 24 combat aircraft remained in parts of the division, the rest was material some were destroyed by enemy aircraft in large numbers at airfields. [...]

The evacuation of bases and units from the front lines is not organized, the command itself shows panic, which causes a large loss of ammunition and other types of technical supplies.

July 3 this year the 110th air base of the 6th air division was relocated from the Oepochka area, the engineer Kashinien and the assistant chief of staff for logistics Major Shmelev, responsible for loading, left the enemy with 48 wagons of aerial bombs, having no explosives.

July 6 this year The 25th air base of the 8th air division was relocated from the town of Karamyshev, 4 platforms were submitted for the transportation of goods, however, Colonel Shevchenko ordered to blow up the supply of bombs and fuel, destroy the existing 9 aircraft,

throw ShKAS machine guns into the wells. Which was done, and platforms and vehicles were used to transport personal items of command (motorcycles, bicycles, padded cars).

The destruction of the materiel, fuel supplies and air bombs was not necessary, since the enemy was at a great distance from the base, there was a full opportunity to transfer to the rear.

13th, 127th and 206th Air Bases stampede most stocks left in the territory occupied by the enemy, without destroying military equipment.

The commander of the 127th air base, senior lieutenant Chetyrkin, left the enemy 5,144 air bombs (of various brands), 442,500 rifle and aviation cartridges and 10 ShKAS machine guns at the Grudzhay site.

18 wagons of air bombs, 3 million air cartridges, several tons of gasoline, food, clothing and technical warehouses were left in Siauliai.

The supply department of the front air force headquarters, headed by military engineer 1st rank Ivanov and quartermaster 1st rank Lisyansky, does not really manage the evacuation of military equipment, they did not give instructions to air units in case of retreat in terms of taking measures with fuel and ammunition. Staff members sent to the unit to manage the evacuation do not provide practical assistance.

The military engineer Bataev, who was sent from headquarters to the Shauliai garrison, instead of providing practical assistance to the garrison in transporting ammunition, enlisted a receipt from the commander of the base, Lubogoshchev, obliging the latter to withdraw all property.

Battalion commissar Malozhin, senior political instructor Barybin and head of the general unit Kudryavtsev were sent to destroy the secret and top secret documentation of the 10th air regiment and the 206th base in the city of Mitava [Jelgava]. collection of personal belongings, as a result, the documentation of these units, including the cipher, remained undestroyed during the retreat.

The Air Force of the front, having lost its bases, is content with the supply of ammunition, fuel and vehicles from the depots of the Leningrad Oblast, the stocks of which, being not designed to support two fronts, cannot fully satisfy the requests of the Air Force of the North-Western Front" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 376 - 379.].

The situation for **the Air Force of the Western Front** was no better. So, according to the report of Leonov, authorized by the 3rd department of the 10th mixed air division, dated June 27, "there was an alarm in the Velsky Fighter Aviation Regiment 2 hours before the raid, and they had just gone home when a German air raid was carried out.

At dawn on Sunday, June 22, German aviation attacked the fortress, the training ground and all the places of deployment of Red Army units in the mountains with a number of 100 aircraft. Brest. The German aviation knew with particular accuracy the location of our airfields, which were subjected to machine gun fire with incendiary bullets, as a result of which in the Brest-Kobrin direction, which was covered by 4 regiments of the 10th air division, located: 123rd IAP - in the village. Name day (Kobrin), 74th ShAP - Small Platoons (which is 18 km from the border), 33rd IAP - mountains. Pruzhany and the 39th SBAP - mountains. Pinsk, German aviation underwent almost complete annihilation on the ground. There are only a few combat-ready materiel left. It is characteristic that the materiel in these regiments, with the exception of the 39th air regiment, was not dispersed.

At the Pinsk airfield, where the 39th SBAP is deployed, the squadron of Pinsk flotilla aircraft, which was not dispersed, was completely destroyed by the enemy. It is characteristic that objects located closer to the German border, such as: the 74th ShAP, the 123rd IAP were attacked earlier than the 39th SBAP, [but] did not warn our units located in a remote place from the front line, that is, from



German border, as a result of this, enemy aircraft destroyed these, the most remote airfields, by shelling from machine guns.

At the same time, military camps and houses of command personnel were subjected to heavy bombardment, resulting in mountains from the fortress and the range. Brest, a small number of people remained from the families and command staff, the rest all died in the ruins of houses. So, for example, the regimental school in the fortress of Brest was destroyed, none of the cadets could escape.

In the mountains Kobrin, many died in the destroyed houses of command personnel and their members families of the headquarters of the 4th army.

From the 472nd artillery regiment, 7 families were saved; from the 48th Infantry Regiment, 6 were saved families.

Warehouses of gasoline and ammunition of the 33rd IAP, 123rd IAP, 39th SBAP were destroyed.

According to the 39th SBAP, despite the fact that 3 raids were carried out, they could not defend and preserve the materiel of the aircraft.

The flight crew suffered almost no losses, with the exception of the 74th ShAP, about which the command of the division had no data, since communication with this regiment was interrupted, and it was impossible to establish contact with the U-2 aircraft, since the enemy air raid was carried out wave with a short interval.

Despite the heavy losses of aircraft materiel in the 10th air division, the remaining 6 aircraft of the 123rd IAP produced a strong repulse of the enemy air force attack, both on the station, military town and mountains. Kobrin.

When a squadron of enemy aircraft appeared, numbering from 12 to 18 aircraft, our pilots of 2 - 3 aircraft of the 123rd air regiment flew towards, took a head-on battle, shooting down 3 - 4 aircraft, put the enemy to flight and did not give the opportunity to cause further destruction.

German pilots are dressed in civilian uniforms - in gray cloth single-breasted uniforms, trousers of the same quality as the service jacket, without any emblems and military-style buttons, caps with large leather earmuffs, in civilian silk shirts, yellow leather boots with thick soles. Over all this, they are dressed in gray flight suits. Clothing, apparently, serves as shelter in case of forced landings.

Of the killed German pilots, one was a Pole, one taken prisoner pilot, also turned out to be a Pole.

The same uniform was worn by the pilot of the downed plane near Pinsky airfield.

German pilots fly on aircraft manufactured in the Czech factory "Skoda", have a personal weapon "Parabellum".

The main reason for the large number of aircraft losses at the airfields was the fact that the division command did not disperse the mat-part of the aircraft. In addition, the raid was sudden, and the protection of airfields from subsequent German air raids after the first attack was not organized.

This fact took place in the 39th SBAP, where there were 3 raids. As a result of the absent-mindedness of the command and the lack of an order to act, the materiel of the aircraft was destroyed. During the last raid, the SB plane that took off shot down the enemy Yu-88 plane.

Anti-aircraft machine guns at the airfields were inactive. The machine guns on the surviving aircraft were not activated. Between the breaks in the raids, no measures were taken to save the equipment of the aircraft.

On the very first day of hostilities, the entire flight crew was at the airfields, did nothing, that is, did not go to the rear and was at a loss, as a result of the fact that there was nothing to fight with.

At the airfields, preparations were mainly made to repulse the proposed landing. Stocks of bombs, food, uniforms were not taken to the rear, the bombs were not dispersed.

With the enemy attacking the air garrison of the 123rd and 33rd IAP, the reserves, apparently, will not be destroyed, since the evacuation is completely unorganized, they are running in disarray, then the main attention of these garrisons will be focused on saving the lives of families.

The command of the division does not plan to evacuate military personnel and family members.

The mood of the personnel is fighting, despite the fact that there are heavy losses. The lack of aircraft materiel drives the pilots to despair.

Enemy aircraft do not engage in battle, whenever ours appear. aircraft out of combat goes at high speeds. [...]

The railway signaling (semaphores, arrows) on the entire highway from Kobrin to Gomel and from Gomel to Moscow are not disguised, they are a good object of bombardment of the railway tracks, which can disrupt the communications of our troops, and also serves as a good guide (beacons) at night during the flights of the German aircraft.

German planes fly along this railway line at night at an altitude of 400-300 meters with two strongly lit headlights (searchlights) and grope for our echelons" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 243 - 249.].

According to the report of the head of the 3rd department of the 10th army, regimental commissar Los, dated July 13, "at 3 hours 58 minutes the first enemy planes appeared over Bialystok and after that they began to bomb the Bialystok airfield, the army communications battalion, the communications center, the railway and a number of other objects. At the same time, almost all the cities and towns where the headquarters of the formations of the 10th Army were located were bombarded.

The 4th air defense brigade, covering Bialystok, was inactive until about 8 a.m. and did not fire a single shot at the enemy. During the investigation, it turned out that the 4th Air Defense Brigade had a special order from the assistant commander of the ZapOVO for air defense until a special order did not shoot at enemy aircraft, and this order was already canceled by the commander of the 10th Army.

The 9th air division stationed in Bialystok, despite being ordered to be on alert from the 20th to the 21st, was also taken by surprise and began to cover Bialystok with several MIG aircraft from the 41st regiment" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 331.].

As indicated in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 37928 dated July 15, "an investigation into the reasons for the destruction of all materiel by fascist aviation in the 41st and 124th IAP of the 9th mixed air division established:

The commander of the 41st Aviation Regiment, Major Ershov, at the time of the enemy aircraft raid on the morning of June 22, was confused and could not organize the personnel of the regiment to repulse the enemy.

Despite the fact that during the first raid of fascist aircraft on the Siburchin airfield, where the 41st IAP was stationed, the enemy did not disable a single combat aircraft, since all of them were dispersed and camouflaged, Ershov did not take independent actions to deliver a decisive blow to enemy aircraft, awaiting instructions from the command of the 9th AD.

Major Ershov, having a combat regiment at his disposal, instead of deciding to act in formations, sent 1-2 aircraft towards the enemy, which were destroyed by the enemy. Thus, the best pilots of the regiment - Solokha, Aksenov, Chernyavsky - were killed, and Krutoverets, Korobkov, Kukushkin and Kiselev were shot down.

Ershov, having no need to relocate from the Siburchin airfield, since this airfield had everything for combat, decided to transfer the regiment to the Kuryany airfield, and then on the evening of June 22 he moved to the Kvartera airfield.

Subsequently, all the materiel was destroyed due to the fact that the aircraft at these airfields did not have air for refueling aircraft and a cartridge for the BS machine gun, which turned out to be incapable of combat.

The commander of the 124th IAP, Major Polunin, was on vacation at the time of hostilities and arrived at the regiment only on the afternoon of June 22, when the enemy had already made two raids on the airfield. After the third raid by enemy aircraft, Polunin flew away on a UTI-4 aircraft without giving any instructions.

The assistant commander of the 124th IAP, Captain Kruglov, remained with the regiment commander during his vacation, on June 22 in the morning, during a raid, the fascist aviation was confused and did not take decisive measures to combat it.

All Kruglov's orders were unorganized. Aircraft were launched into the air not by units, but by singles, which did not give the desired effect in repelling enemy aircraft.

Most of the MIG-3 fighters did not fire machine guns, since the team of Plant No. 1 did not have time to adjust them. All this led to the fact that all the planes of the regiment were destroyed" [Ibid. D. 100. L. 96 - 98.].

According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36701 dated July 5, "the VNOS and air defense services for the defense of Minsk worked extremely poorly. In a number of cases, there was no signaling and communication at the time of the appearance of enemy aircraft. Anti-aircraft batteries acted erratically. When one battery opened fire, others opened fire behind it, not knowing whether they were firing at enemy planes or at their own. On June 23, our anti-aircraft batteries damaged 3 SB aircraft during shelling. There was a shelling over their airfield of SB aircraft of the 313th separate reconnaissance aviation regiment, returning from a combat mission, by fighters of the 163rd IAP of the 43rd air division.

This caused a number of negative sentiments among the regiment's personnel.

The commander of the 6th battery of military unit 4229 of the 7th air defense brigade, junior lieutenant Chekurov, fled after shelling the battery from an enemy aircraft, leaving the fighters, who then also fled" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 205 - 206.].

Similar problems arose before **the Air Force of the Southwestern Front**. As stated in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36137 dated July 1, "despite the signals about the real possibility of an enemy attack, individual commanders of the units of the South-Western Front were unable to quickly repel the enemy attack.

In the mountains Chernivtsi June 21 this year the flight crew was released to the city, due to which fighter planes were not raised to repel an enemy attack.

The commander of the 87th IAP and the 16th air division, Major Slygin and his deputy for political affairs, the battalion commissar Cherny, on the night of June 22, together with other commanders, were drinking in a restaurant in the city of Buchach. After receiving a telegram from the headquarters of the 16th air division about a combat alert, the regimental command, being in a drunken state, was unable to quickly put the regiment in order.

June 22 at 5.50 a German bomber appeared over the airfield, which was mistaken for the plane of the division commander. In view of this, he freely from a height of 10 - 15 meters began shelling the airfield and disabled 9 aircraft.

Air defense was poorly organized. Anti-aircraft artillery of five air defense brigades of the front and anti-aircraft divisions, consisting of 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, did not have shells for them.

Pe-2 bombers could not be used to carry out combat missions, as they were armed with heavy machine guns, for which there were no cartridges. [...]

Anti-aircraft artillery of the 18th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the 12th army, guarding the mountains. Stanislav from enemy air raids, did not have 37-mm shells "[Ibid. D. 98. L. 250 - 251.].

According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 35303 dated June 26, "according to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, during the first 3 days of the war, with 7 air raids on Kiev by anti-aircraft artillery and aviation, 1 aircraft was landed in Kiev.

The 3rd Air Defense Division was not prepared for defense. The received new 85-mm anti-aircraft guns were not mastered by the division. The personnel of the division were trained on 76-mm cannons, which were removed from service, 85-mm shells are not enough.

The 36th air division instead of 240 aircraft has 90, of which only 8 aircraft provided with radios. Patrolling over the city is not organized.

The enemy, after reconnaissance and bombing, leaves with impunity, which negatively affects the mood of the population.

Bombing is carried out only on vital objects.

On June 25, the enemy advanced in large groups at low altitude. Despite the intense fire of anti-aircraft artillery, he bombed the Bolshevik iron foundry and the smelting furnace; at plant No. 43, the electrical shop, the 4th, 22nd and 25th shops and the design bureau were destroyed; at the airfield of the civil fleet, 6 civil aviation aircraft and 5 fighters were destroyed. There are about 50 people killed and 105 wounded.

The airfields of the outskirts of Kyiv are clogged with aircraft of a bomber training type and heavy vehicles that can be bombed.

It is required to strengthen the defense of Kyiv with 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 18 37-mm cannons, 81 large-caliber machine guns, one air division and the corresponding number of shells and cartridges" [Ibid. L. 234 - 235.].

But most of all problems arose with the supply of air force and air defense of the Southwestern Front with shells and cartridges. On June 24, 1941, the deputy head of the 3rd department of the KOVO reported: "The anti-aircraft defense units do not have shells, as a result, enemy aircraft are bombing Lutsk every day, Stanislav. 40,000 shells are in the Nizhyn warehouse, near Kyiv. The command decided to transfer them by wagons, it will take 3 days. Shells must be transferred immediately with aircraft, I repeat, immediately with aircraft" [Ibid. L. 125.]. It turned out that the 5th air defense brigade in Tarnopol, the 186th, 139th, 563rd and 259th separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the Southwestern Front, armed with "37-mm and 85-mm cannons, do not have shots for them " and "an urgent dispatch of artillery rounds to the main warehouses from the central warehouses of the GAU is necessary" [Ibid. L. 237.]. Even on July 2, 1941, "the supply of KOVO air units with weapons and ammunition was not established. There are no BS cartridges in the units. The 36th air division is severely limited by PC shells. Shells were delivered to the division, the suspension system of which is not suitable, it is impossible to remake, but there are no necessary ones. The artillery administration of KOVO promises to give 300 pcs. from Vinnitsa, but it is not sure that the shells will be suitable" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 159.].

In addition, it turned out that the interaction between aviation branches and air units of different subordination was poorly developed. The result was combat clashes between Soviet aircraft. So, on June 26, "the head of the 3rd department of the Odessa naval base, comrade. Morozov said that on June 25 at 9 o'clock. 25 min. a link of SB aircraft of the 70th air squadron under the command of the squadron commander, Major Krasnodarsky, having received permission from the air defense of the mountains. Mogilev about the departure, took off from its airfield to perform a combat mission.

After the first turn, the link was fired upon by an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, and then attacked by OdVO Air Force fighters. As a result of the shelling and attack, aircraft 1 and 2, piloted by pilots Kramtsov and Zemtsov, having holes, landed at their airfield.

Aircraft No. 4, piloted by flight commander Anufriev, caught fire in the air. Bombs exploded on landing. The crew died.

At 9 o'clock. 42 min. when returning from reconnaissance, 2 SB-R2 aircraft of the 82nd squadron were attacked by OdVO Air Force fighters. The fighters forced one of the planes to land in the sea" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 236.].

A similar situation took place on the Western Front. As noted in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 35753 dated June 27, "due to the poor organization of communication between the rear and the forward front lines, bomber aircraft, when returning from combat missions to bomb enemy targets, continue to be attacked by our fighters.

On June 26, the planes of the 96th air regiment of the Western Front, flying on a combat mission to destroy enemy motorized columns and tanks in the Minsk direction, in the Merkulevichi area were attacked by a flight of our I-16 fighters, as a result of which Lieutenant Donskoy's plane was shot down, and the response One I-16 aircraft was shot down by bomber fire.

On the same date, our fighters attacked bomber planes of the 98th air regiment of the 52nd air division, returning from the bombing of enemy ground forces. During the attack, the plane of Lieutenant Grishin was shot down, in the Mogilev area the plane was shot down and landed by the deputy] commander of the 52nd air division, Major Kartakov.

The attacks of their fighters cause panic among the flight crew bomber aircraft" [Ibid. L. 270.].

Unfortunately, the Southwestern Front was no exception. According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36253 dated July 2, "in parts of the 36th Air Division of the Southwestern Front, cases of shelling of their aircraft continue, leading to the loss of materiel and the death of the flight crew.

On June 26, from 15.00 to 17.00, several groups of DB-Zf aircraft were attacked by their fighters. As a result of the attacks, one aircraft was shot down and 6 aircraft landed at different airfields in the Kyiv region.

The inability to distinguish their aircraft from enemy aircraft and the assumption These ugly cases are especially notable for the 2nd air regiment of the 36th air division.

Junior pilot - Lieutenant Zaitsev attacked the SB aircraft of the 52nd SBAP. Letnab is slightly wounded, the plane needs repair.

The squadron commander of the same regiment, Soldatov, with his pilots, fired twice at his SU-2 and Douglas aircraft. Soldatov, arriving at the airfield, reported that he clearly saw crosses and a swastika.

The pilot of this regiment, Bardner, shot down the DB-Zf aircraft. The plane burned down. Crew accidentally survived.

The pilots of the 2nd Air Regiment attacked the DB-Zf aircraft, which had already launched their landing gear. As a result, one gunner-radio operator was killed, and the gunner-radio operator on the second plane was wounded.

On June 26, at 10 o'clock, an I-16 aircraft attacked a DB-Zf aircraft of the 22nd Air Division, which was returning after completing a combat mission. As a result, the pilot of the DB-Zf aircraft was slightly wounded in the arm, the radio operator was seriously injured, and the aircraft burned down.

A link of DB-Zf aircraft, flying on a combat mission, lost orientation in the Sarna area. After a 90-degree turn with access to the Dnieper to restore the landmark, the flight was attacked by its I-16 aircraft. One of the attacked DB-Zf aircraft was carrying bombs, the other two dropped bombs in an unknown area on their territory.

All three DB-Zf aircraft were damaged, the gunner-radio operator junior sergeant Goberman was killed" [Ibid. D.99. L. 158 - 159.].

Similar cases took place in the future. So, for example, according to the special report of the Special Department of the NKVD No. 39778 dated August 4, on the North-Western Front "July 13 of this year. a group of aircraft "DB-Zf" of the 53rd air regiment of the 40th air division of the 1st

air corps on the flight route to a combat mission at 19:32 in the area of the village of Nikitinki, Kalinin Region, was attacked 4 times by a flight of MIG-3 fighters of the 27th IAP.

As a result of the attacks, the DB-Zf aircraft piloted by Lieutenant Knyazev was hit, fell to the ground and caught fire from the explosion. The crew commander, Lieutenant Knyazev, burned down, the rest of the crew escaped with minor injuries.

The second DB-Zf aircraft, having received holes in the gas tank and the left plane, returned to its Budovo airfield. The gunner-radio operator of this aircraft, junior military engineer Gavrin, was wounded in the shoulder.

The direct culprit of this incident, the fighter flight commander of the 27th air regiment, junior lieutenant Karachevich, who clearly saw the identification marks (star), nevertheless attacked the DB-Zf aircraft, opening fire on them from machine guns.

Karachevich explained his actions by the fact that the DB-Zf aircraft did not respond to his signals by swinging their wings, and he doubted that they belonged to his aircraft.

The materials of the investigation were handed over to the military prosecutor of the 24th air division for putting Karachevich on trial.

On the same date at 6:45 p.m. in the area of vil. Dokhoslavl, Kalinin region, 5 I-16 aircraft of the 29th IAP attacked a DB-Zf 200th air regiment of the 40th air division, returning from a combat mission. The fighter group was led by the commander of the 29th air regiment, Captain Leshko.

When the DB-Zf aircraft was turning for landing, the fighter pilot Popov went into its tail and fired two bursts from a machine gun, but, noticing the identification marks, the shelling stopped and went down.

After that, Captain Leshko himself attacked the DB-Zf aircraft, opening fire on it. The DB-Zf plane let out its landing gear, trying to land on the airfield, but, without calculating the landing, went to the second circle.

Captain Leshko again went into the tail of the DB-Zf aircraft and, despite the signals from the rockets, fired three more machine-gun bursts at it, after which the DB-Zf aircraft caught fire. Gunner-radio operator Petrachkov and air gunner Polyantsev jumped out of the burning plane on parachutes. Captain Leshko fired a machine gun at them, wounding them.

Aircraft "DB-Zf" together with the pilot - Senior Lieutenant Novikov and navigator lieutenant Bykov burned down.

The material of the investigation was handed over to the military prosecutor of the 31st and AD for bringing Leshko to criminal responsibility" [Ibid. D. 100. L. 326 - 328.].

\* \* \*

The enemy attack found the troops **of the Northwestern Front** unprepared for any immediate military action. As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 4/37155 dated July 8, 1941, "in addition to No. 36833 dated July 7, 1941, we inform you that the investigation carried out by the 3rd Department of the North-Western Front, the fact that the order was given by a member of the Military Council PribOVO Dibrov regarding the clearance of minefields and the surrender of cartridges issued to personnel in parts 11 ck and 125 sd before the start of hostilities, is confirmed.

The investigation found:

After the Intelligence Department received data on the concentration of German troops on our borders, parts of the corps began to mine the fields, distribute ammunition to personnel, and at the same time, preparations began for the evacuation of the families of command personnel.

June 21 this year a member of the Military Council of the PribOVO Corps Commissar Dibrova arrived at the place of concentration of the 11 [th] [rifle] corps and ordered immediately

to take away ammunition from the fighters and clear the fields, explaining this as a possible provocation on the part of our units.

The head of the OPP of the 125th Infantry Division, Levchenko, gave Dibrov's explanation of the reasons for the evacuation of the families of the command staff, referring to the data of the intelligence department about the beginning concentration of enemy troops on the borders.

To Levchenko's explanation, Dibrova said: "Although Germany is a fascist country, the moment when they can start a war with the USSR has not yet matured, that our eyes widen with fear."

After that, Dibrova ordered for the second time to stop the panic, take away the issued cartridges from the fighters, clear the fields, and stop preparing for the evacuation of families command staff.

On the same day, June 21, divisional commissar Shabalov, a member of the Military Council of the 8th Army, confirmed by telegram Dibrov's order to stop preparations for the evacuation. As a result, at the time of the enemy's offensive, the families of the commanding officers had to be taken out during the battle, while a significant part of the families died; the personnel of the division were without ammunition and their issuance was carried out under enemy artillery fire.

True, P.A. Dibrova explained his orders by the fact that "there were no mined fields, due to the lack of mines. It was about preparing for the mining of fields (holes), referring to the instructions of the commander. The cartridges were instructed to be taken away and handed over to platoon posts or squads. The evacuation of the families of the commanders was forbidden by the people's commissar of defense [Ibid. D. 101. L. 328 - 329; D. 105. L. 55 - 56.].

On June 22, the 3rd department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front reported that "according to unverified information, there are cases of local kulak actions in the rear of the 128th rifle division. In the 29th national corps, cases of combat sabotage by former officers of the Lithuanian army were noted. The 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR gave instructions on their arrest" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 174.].

The neighboring 48th Rifle Division found itself in an equally difficult situation. As the investigation into the reasons for its defeat showed, reported in a special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 38186 dated July 18, "the command of the division, having received the task of concentrating its troops on the border, withdrew parts of the division almost unprepared for combat with the enemy. The necessary supply of ammunition and shells was not taken. The division went to the border as if it were just another exercise, taking with it the training aids.

In addition, by the beginning of hostilities, the division was not mobilized even in peacetime states. There was a large shortage of command and rank and file and materiel.

In this state, by June 22, the division concentrated in 2 places: rifle regiments on the German border, to the left of the city of Taurage, artillery regiments and special units beyond the mountains. Rossiens [Raseiniai], which made the interaction of artillery with infantry impossible.

The command of the division, being directly on the battlefield, died on June 23 during the German attack. The following were killed: division commander Major General Bogdanov, regimental commissar Fominov, chief of staff Brodnikov and a number of other commanders.

After the enemy disabled communications, the division completely lost its leadership and began to retreat. Rifle regiments, having no communication with each other, fought independently, making their way from the encirclement.

Along with the units of the division, the construction battalions and individual groups of soldiers of the 125th Infantry Division randomly retreated. This brought panic and disorganization.

On June 25, the division concentrated in the mountains. Siauliai, where the command of the division was taken over by the deputy] commander of the division for the combat unit, Colonel Melnikov.

From mountains. Shauliai to the shore of Lake Peipus, the withdrawal of units of the 48th Infantry Division was extremely disorganized. The command post of the division was separated from the regiments at a distance of 50-80 km, there was no connection with the regiments. From June 25 to July 4, the headquarters of the division did not indicate collection points and routes, individual units made random marches and wandered" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 370 - 371.].

During the fighting on June 22, 1941, the enemy managed not only to push the advanced units of the North-Western Front of the Red Army from the border, but also to cut the Soviet front at the junction of the 8th and 11th armies. It was in this gap that the command of the Army Group "North" introduced parts of the 4th Panzer Group, which rushed to Daugavpils. The Soviet command lost sight of this direction for several days, and the appearance of German tanks near the city on June 26 turned out to be completely unexpected. In addition, as reported on June 27 by the head of the 2nd department of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, brigade commissar Avseevich, "the garrison of the city of Dvinsk [Dagavpils] is not provided with defense means and in the event of an airborne landing by the enemy, it will not be able to repel his attack, since in the garrison has only 150 rifles with which the cadets of the ShMAS are armed. The flight crew is armed with TT pistols and there are 50 grenades for the entire crew. The lack of security of the garrison with means of defense gives rise to a panic mood among the personnel" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 133 - 134.].

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 35134 of June 25, "according to the 3 [th] department of the North-Western Front, on June 24, 1941, the enemy advanced 80 km in the Kaunas direction, directing the attack to the northeast, and in the Siauliai direction advanced 60-70 km. A serious situation is being created for the 11th Army and the left flank of the 8th Army.

Command and control of troops from the headquarters of the front and below is bad. The front headquarters often loses contact with the armies. Radio stations are poorly used.

On the night of June 24 of this year. the enemy occupied Kaunas. [...]

The material part of the artillery of the front dropped out in significant numbers.

Most of them were left during the withdrawal, for example: the 414th howitzer artillery regiment of the 125th rifle division withdrew 2-3 guns from the battle due to the loss of the horse staff.

The supply of ammunition, especially shells, is poor. Absolutely there are no shells of 85-mm, 37-mm, 107-mm, at the end of the consumption of 122-mm and 155-mm.

Counterattack of the 12th mechanized corps on June 23 of this year. essentially disrupted due to the lack of communication and control by the front headquarters. After the order for a counterattack was issued on the evening of June 22, the front headquarters had absolutely no connection with the corps during the day, did not know about the preparation for the counterattack, the very course of the counterattack, as a result, the corps was late with the attack by 6 hours, the strike was delivered separately and in general - no impact result.

Parts suffer heavy losses in people and materiel, and their replenishment No.

According to preliminary data, the 2nd Panzer Division, acting in the direction of Rossien [Raseiniai], knocked out 40 tanks and 18 enemy guns.

3rd Front Department to provide assistance and improve communications, sent to the army for a long period from the apparatus of the 3rd department of the front 35 operational workers.

Together with the command, barrier detachments were organized to detain those who arbitrarily leave their combat positions and to collect those who wander.

A fight against manifestations of local banditry was organized" [Ibid. L. 163 - 164.].

On June 25, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO reported that "the 3rd [th] department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front reported that due to enemy bombing, communication with the troops often stops. The restoration work of the communication line is carried out by the People's Commissariat of Communications very slowly, while the military units in the restoration of permanent lines do not participate.



The protection of airfields, warehouses, and troops from enemy air attack is poorly organized due to the lack of anti-aircraft weapons, as a result of which the enemy often bombs with impunity.

Rear services are slowly being deployed to provide for the active troops, military formations suffer losses, but reinforcements do not arrive.

There is no printed propaganda among the German soldiers and the German population at the front. is being carried out" [ibid. L. 165.].

At 6.45 on June 26, a message was received from Rezekne to Moscow by the deputy head of the 3rd department of the North-Western Front, Asmolov, who informed that "the situation in the Baltic states of our army requires the immediate intervention of the High Command and the Central Committee of the Party. The leadership of the front lost all contact with the army. The army is uncontrollable, spontaneously retreats, unrest.

To rectify the situation, it is necessary to immediately allocate an air connection for reinforcements, otherwise it threatens with the loss of the main forces" [ibid. L. 2 - 3.].

On June 27, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO reported that "the situation on the North-Western Front from the beginning of military operations to the present is extremely difficult. Since June 23, the Front Headquarters has lost contact with many formations and units, with the 11th Army as a whole, and has essentially stopped directing them, since all attempts to establish contact were unsuccessful.

The main reason for the lack of communication is the destruction of it by enemy aircraft, as well as the actions of scattered sabotage and insurgent groups from among the people of local citizens who sympathize with German National Socialism.

In some parts, communication was not provided due to the lack of a telephone cable, which resulted in a lack of interaction between the branches of the armed forces (infantry and artillery).

As we have already pointed out, the aviation of the Northwestern Front on the first day of the war suffered heavy losses of combat aircraft destroyed by the enemy on the ground (400 of the available 880 aircraft on the ground were destroyed).

In the following days, from June 23 to June 26, enemy aircraft, having gained absolute air superiority, bombed our troops with impunity, both on the front line and in the rear, while the lack of sufficient air defense facilities also had a significant effect.

Despite the heroic efforts of our troops, on the very first day of the war, German aviation, having gained air superiority, inflicted significant losses on our troops, which did not receive replenishment.

The air superiority gained by the German forces, the use of significant armored forces operating in cooperation with aviation, led to the superiority of enemy forces over our troops, as a result, our units began to retreat from the occupied lines, which, in the absence of leadership, began to take on a panic character from the end of June 23. Continuous unpunished air raids complicated the situation. The parts of the 11th Army, which suffered heavy losses, were subjected to especially strong panic, in relation to which the headquarters of the North-Western Front had no information from June 23 to 26.

Separate formations of the 11th Army, being surrounded by the enemy, were almost completely destroyed (5th, 128th rifle divisions, 324th separate anti-aircraft artillery division).

The 12th mechanized corps, which is surrounded by the enemy, also suffered losses.

The panic retreat took on a particularly acute character from all kinds of provocative rumors spread about the actions in the rear of German airborne divisions and sabotage groups, which in many cases actually did not exist.

The front headquarters, receiving incorrect data on airborne assaults from various random persons, equipped operational groups to destroy the landings, and when leaving for the place, information about the landings was often not confirmed. In general, to this day there is no confirmation of the landings, and, in my opinion, there were none.

On the way to the retreat of the units, there were cases of attacks from the forest by individual gangs and loners, which caused great nervousness among the personnel of the retreating units and increased panic.

In connection with the difficult situation that had arisen at the front - the panicked withdrawal of our units of the 11th Army, the necessary measures were taken by the front command and the Political Directorate by sending individual leaders directly to the unit, but all this situation has not been corrected and the situation at the front to date hasn't changed at all" [Ibid. L. 283 - 289.].

On June 28, the head of the 3rd department of the North-Western Front, divisional commissar Babich, sent memorandum No. 03 to Moscow, in which he reported that "parts of the North-Western Front continue to withdraw under enemy pressure. On June 26, units of the 8th Army in an organized manner continued to retreat to a new defensive line. The 10th Rifle Corps withdrew beyond the river. V[e]nta, 11th Rifle Corps - beyond Shauli [Shauliai]. There was no information about the position of the 12th mechanized corps and its whereabouts; the corps headquarters did not respond to radio calls.

The unfavorable situation with ammunition continues to remain in the units. By According to the artillery department of the 8th Army, no more than 1/4 BC of all shots can be in units.

Ammunition from the Linkongan warehouse, from where the 11th Rifle Corps and partly the 10th Rifle Corps were fed, were partly removed during June 25 and 26, and the rest, approximately 70-100 wagons, were blown up.

According to the representative of the Artistic Directorate of the Front, who was at the command post of the 8th Army, on June 26 of this year. parts of the army must be supplied with ammunition from the depots of the mountains. Riga. Sending ammunition by train from Riga by rail is considered risky, since the possibility of bombardment by enemy aircraft is not ruled out.

Such arguments of the Artistic Directorate have a detrimental effect on the course of hostilities, especially since it is not possible to deliver ammunition by road, due to its absence in the units and at the army headquarters.

Through the Military Council of the front, we are taking measures to deliver ammunition to parts in different ways.

As a result of continuous battles with the enemy, parts of the front lost a large amount of materiel. So, for example, as of June 26, the 125th Rifle Division has 3 anti-tank guns, 2 76-mm guns, the 414th light artillery regiment has 2 guns, and the 459th howitzer artillery regiment has 18 guns.

The command of the front, armies, corps and divisions cannot carry out their activities in an organized manner, as a result of which panic moods appear and there is no possibility of firmly implementing the planned measures. So, for example, on June 22 of this year. at the request of the commander of the 10th rifle division, Major General Fadeev, the commander of the 10th rifle corps, Major General Nikolaev, promised to give 2 tank battalions to the 23rd tank division.

On June 22, Major General Nikolaev gave an oral order to the commander of the 23rd Panzer Division, Colonel Orlyonok, to place 2 tank battalions from his division at the disposal of the commander of the 10th Infantry Division to support the infantry during the offensive to deliver a counterattack to the enemy with its subsequent destruction and occupation of the previous position on state border.

On June 23, the commander of the 10th rifle corps gave a combat order to the commander of the 10th rifle division that, in cooperation with units of the 10th rifle division with 2 tank battalions of the 23rd tank division, destroy

advancing units of the enemy, would restore the previously occupied position with the subsequent infliction of a counterattack on the enemy. On the basis of the combat order of the commander of the 10th Rifle Corps, the division command developed a combat order for the units to go on the offensive with the support of 2 tank battalions 23rd Panzer Division.

The commander of the 23rd Panzer Division, Colonel Orlyonok, told the commander of the 10th Infantry Division that he would provide the division with 2 tank battalions to 5 - 6 a.m. June 23. In this regard, all the units were warned that our offensive would be supported by 2 tank battalions, which inspired the entire personnel of the units with the desire to destroy the enemy.

The offensive was scheduled for June 23 at 6 o'clock in the morning. The commander of the 23rd Panzer Division, Colonel Orlyonok, not only did not send these 2 battalions by 6 o'clock in the morning on June 23, but did not even consider it necessary to notify the division commander in a timely manner. The offensive was postponed until the arrival of the battalions. On June 23, Colonel Orlyonok arrived at the command post of the 10th Rifle Division at 23:30 and stated that the commander of the 8th Army did not allow him to give 2 battalions of tanks for the 10th Rifle Division and ordered him to carry out his first order and that he in this regard, can not give these battalions. In fact, these 2 tank battalions were sent at the disposal of the 10th Infantry Division and were in the Plunge area and were inactive for a day and a half. But the command of the 10th Infantry Division was not aware of the presence of these battalions in the area of the city of Plunge. As a result, the offensive of the division's units was thwarted, and the tanks were in the area of the town of Plunge for a day and a half and were inactive. In addition, on June 24, parts of the division retreated in the direction of the mountains. Tyalshaya [Telyiyay]. The Red Army men, who were guarding the command post of the division, reported the presence of tanks moving in the direction of Tyalshaya.

The command of the division, knowing that no tanks were attached to the division, and the tanks of the 23rd Panzer Division were mistaken for enemy tanks, as a result of which an alarming situation was created that the enemy had cut off the division's path to Tyalynai [Telynyai] and the division was surrounded. In fact, there were no enemy tanks, and they were 2 tank battalions of the 23rd tank division. The offensive on June 23 for the division was the most convenient moment, the enemy only had 2 infantry divisions and 2 artillery divisions, and already on the evening of June 23, according to the testimony of prisoners, the enemy pulled up 2 more infantry divisions and several artillery regiments in our direction and launched an active offensive.

Who specifically gave the order to these battalions to go to the disposal of the 10th rifle division has not been established. The actions of the commander of the 23rd Panzer Division, which entailed the creation of an exceptionally difficult situation for the division, are criminally negligent.

An investigation is underway on this issue, the results will be reported.

additionally.

The commander of the 8th Army, in connection with the withdrawal of units and the critical situation created in the area of the 12th mechanized corps, by the end of the day on June 25 (surrounded by the enemy), in order to avoid being cut off at 1.00 on June 26, decided to change the command post. The organization of the evacuation to the new command post was extremely ugly. The headquarters was not an organized unit retreating to a new command post, but a panicked unit.

The order to evacuate the command post was given at 01:00 on June 26, with the expectation of departure in 40 minutes. Lieutenant Colonel Mamchenko and a military engineer of the 3rd rank Shishkin, who were appointed responsible for the evacuation, did not properly organize this work, but turned it into a panic. Cars for departments for loading property and things were not organized. The departments seized the cars on their own and loaded their things. All work on the evacuation took place in a bustle and bustle, as a result of which the headquarte

instead of the appointed time of 1.40, I left at 4.20. On the site of the old command post, the following were abandoned: a map with the situation, inventory, a foreign-made car.

The location of the new command post was known to an exceptionally limited circle of people who left in the echelon with the command. The remaining 2 echelons did not know the location of the command post, and therefore for a long time they were confused along the roads in search of it. The main staff of the headquarters arrived at the command post only at 13.00 on June 26, having thus spent 9 hours on the road.

As a result of such disorganization and the echeloning of the headquarters in the daytime, the echelons along the way were subjected to bombing and machine-gun fire from aircraft. There are losses among the Red Army guard battalion: 1 killed, 3 wounded. It is characteristic to note that all these panicked evacuations of the command post took place at a time when the command post was 30 km from the front line.

The rapid advance of the enemy's motorized parts on June 26 of this year. created a threat to the city of Dvinsk [Daugavpils]. To prevent the enemy in the mountains. Dvinsk and on the right bank of the Dvina River, it was decided to blow up two bridges across the river. Dvina, however, as a result of the lack of organization of the command, the bridges were not blown up, and the enemy, having crossed the river, occupied the mountains on June 27. Dvinsk. After some time, our units drove the enemy out of the mountains. Dvinsk. Under pressure from him, our units were forced to leave the mountains again. Dvinsk, however, the location in the city was not used and the bridges were not blown up, which made it possible for the enemy to reach the right bank of the river.

Panic in front of the enemy infected not only the fighters, but also a large number of command personnel. So, for example: assistant to the commander of the 459th GAP of the 125th rifle division, Major Kondratyuk Grigory Sergeevich, born in 1900, member of the CPSU (b), at the time of the artillery fire opened by the German troops at 5 o'clock. 30 min. June 22 arbitrarily left the firing positions. At 8.30 on June 22, the commander of the GAP in the name of Kondratyuk ordered the withdrawal of the 3rd division, but since Kondratyuk was not at the location of the division, the order was not executed and the division managed to withdraw only 8 guns to new firing positions, leaving a lot of shells in place and food. Returned to unit June 23.

The material about Kondratyuk's escape is being filed for arrest and trial by the Military Tribunal.

The commander of the 206th autobattalion of the 125th rifle division of captain Starovoitov, a member of the CPSU (b), has been in the rear from the first day of the battle. Starovoitov during the bombing of the mountains. Tauragÿ did not ensure the removal of gasoline and cars, but most of all took care of himself personally.

Major Kornilkov, the head of supply of the 125th Infantry Division, has not been at the front since the beginning of hostilities. According to the statement of Captain Sizov, Kornilkov sent his family and has not appeared at the headquarters until now.

On June 25, with the move of the headquarters of the North-Western Front from Ponevezhys, at the command post, by order of the commander, the task force of the headquarters, headed by the deputy chief of staff for operations, Major General Trukhin, was left.

To protect the command post in Ponevezhys, Major General Trukhin had at his disposal anti-aircraft defense consisting of 12 guns, air defense consisting of 9 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns and a company of an airborne battalion.

On June 25, Trukhin left the command post, and the units guarding the command post were not given clear instructions and their dispatch to the new location of the command post was not organized, as a result, Trukhin, having left in a car, essentially abandoned the units to the mercy of fate, who were confused on the road and did not arrive at the new place of the command post.

The anti-tank guns, due to the lack of traction for them, were loaded onto trucks, which Trukhin ordered to follow him, but since the trucks

they could not keep up with a passenger car, cars with guns for various reasons lagged behind on the road, and Trukhin ignored this.

Trukhin was again returned to the unit to establish contact with them. According to the information received, he ran into the Germans and was killed" [Ibid. D. 103. L. 80 - 87.]. However, as it turned out later, Trukhin was wounded and taken prisoner, where he began to cooperate with the Germans.

According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 4/35820 dated June 29, "The 3rd department of the North-Western Front reports: created by barrage detachments to combat banditry, espionage and sabotage, as well as on the return of their units who fled or lost at the front, the following has been done:

in the region of mountains. Krupiskis (Lithuanian SSR) partially eliminated the insurgent kulak gang that appeared on June 21, consisting of up to 100 people. 43 people were arrested, including 9 fighters and 2 commanders of the 29th Rifle Corps, the rest from the civilian population.

The Military Tribunal considered the case in an expedited manner, 27 people were sentenced to death, the remaining 16 people were sent to the mountains. Polotsk to the central prison.

Captured 3 paratroopers dropped from a German bomber in the area of Dvinsk. During the seizure, officer Helm offered armed resistance and killed one activist from the city of Dvinsk. During interrogation, Helm stated that, as a German nationalist and enemy of communism, he would not give any evidence.

Helm was sentenced to death by a military tribunal" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 290 - 291.].

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 4 / 36833 dated July 7, "The 3rd department of the North-Western Front on July 3 of this year. reported the following data on the situation in parts of the front:

The 27th Army included 4 corps, the personnel of the latter range from a thousand to a thousand and a half people.

The formations and units that are part of the 27th Army are not combat-ready, as they have lost their materiel and personnel.

About how many were killed, wounded, missing and fled, not a single part can give accurate data.

The command of the 27th Army is only establishing communication with the corps, the situation in the army sector, the presence of the enemy, his direction and approximate plan are not known.

The fight against the tank and motor units of the enemy, as well as with his aviation, units of the 27th Army is not conducted, due to the complete absence of the material part. In separate areas of the enemy they beat off rifle and machine-gun fire.

The enemy feels complete impunity on our part, descends over the front line and fires at our units, as well as residents in cities, at low level.

The lack of support for the infantry by tanks, aircraft and artillery causes bewilderment among the top command staff of the armies and negative moods among a number of unstable commanders and fighters.

Some commanders assess the current situation as a betrayal on the part of the high command, which has not yet been revealed, and believe that our tactics are tactics of first infantry, and then tank units, not supported by infantry and aviation. Anti-Soviet elements are fueling these sentiments and creating panic among the personnel of the army units.

On June 25, while moving from the city of Tallinn to the city of Shavli [Shauliai] to lead the combat operations of the 11th rifle division and the 180th territorial rifle division, units and the command of the 65th rifle corps met on a highway 18 km from the city of Mitava [Jelgava] with a group of Red Army soldiers and commanders of the 11th and 90th

rifle divisions, retreating randomly from forward positions. Instead of taking measures to stop the flow of retreating troops and organize the defense, the command of the 65th Rifle Corps fled, introducing even more disorganization into the retreat.

The headquarters of the 65th Rifle Corps did not establish contact with the 11th Rifle Division and the 180th Rifle Division.

June 29 this year after the shelling of the column of the 65th rifle corps by the bandits, the panic increased even more. As a result, the column of the 65th Rifle Corps was divided into two groups. One of them (headquarters, part of the 3rd department and the commandant's platoon) moved towards the town of Weymouth, and where it is currently unknown. The second group (123rd OBS, part of the sapper battalion and the operational staff of the 3rd department) moved towards the city of Riga and after a while joined the 8th army.

Parts of the 65th Rifle Corps did not accept the battle with the enemy due to indiscipline and panic created by the corps command itself, and dispersed in different directions; where they currently are is unknown.

On June 28, part of the 10th Infantry Division began to withdraw in the direction of the city of Riga. On the way from Mitava [Jelgava] to Riga were cut off by the enemy: 204th, 48th rifle regiments, 30th light artillery regiment.

On the morning of June 29, units of the 10th Infantry Division began to defend the left bank of the river Western Dvina, reflecting the onslaught of the enemy.

A shortcoming in the combat operations of the units of the 10th Infantry Division was the lack of communication between the division headquarters and its units operating on the right and left flanks. Shooting was carried out on the map without appropriate adjustment, as a result, the accuracy of fire was low and some of the shells hit the location of our units and their headquarters.

Approaching from the city of Mitava [Jelgava] to the city of Riga, the 30th light artillery regiment was mistaken for enemy artillery, and fire was opened on it. In turn, the 30th light artillery regiment opened fire on the city of Riga.

Despite the active activity of enemy aviation, our aviation in the area Riga did not appear on June 29.

The command of the 8th Army does not carry out the necessary leadership of subordinate formations, it works uncertainly, without sufficient decisiveness. Panic reigns at the army headquarters and rear units, caused by unsubstantiated stories of military personnel of units of the 48th and 125th rifle divisions retreating from the front, and systematic raids by enemy aircraft on the rear units of the army. There is no fight against enemy aircraft.

Due to the lack of leadership, units and subunits are withdrawing from the front lines. lines to new lines of defense, wherever they want.

The 11th Rifle Corps, retreating with stubborn battles, gave the enemy 200 km deep into the front. The reasons for the failure of the corps in battles were the complete unpreparedness for hostilities. 10 hours before the start of hostilities, by order of a member of the Military Council of the PribOVO, corps commissar Dibrov, cartridges were collected and the laying of mines on the front line of defense was stopped. Previously placed mines were removed.

Anticipating a retreat, the commanders of units and formations do not communicate to the troops the routes of probable withdrawal, the points of regroupings and formations, as a result of which the result is not a retreat, but a stampede.

The 55th Tank Regiment did not participate in combat operations, with the exception of two attacks.

On June 24 and 25, the personnel of the regiment remained without food, did not sleep for three days. All this caused massive unhealthy conversations. When the regiment retreated to the rear, 15% of the vehicles were left along the way.

Losses in personnel and materiel are not taken into account by the headquarters of the regiment. The staff of the regimental headquarters are inactive.

The 202nd motorized division, when withdrawing on June 24, had no support either from the left or from the right. They retreated disorganized, leaving a lot of weapons, ammunition, materiel, food and losing a significant number of personnel.

The 28th heavy artillery regiment and the reconnaissance battalion of the 11th rifle corps found themselves in this approximate position.

Recently, as a result of the work of barrage detachments, desertion and disorderly flight from army units has ceased. The retreat is already being carried out in a more organized manner" [Ibid. D. 101. L. 330 - 333.].

\* \* \*

The situation that developed at the beginning of the war on **the Western Front** also revealed a number of problems. According to the report of the authorized 3rd department of the 10th mixed air division Leonov dated June 27, "at 12 o'clock in the morning on June 22, 1941, from Germany in the Brest area (fortress and training ground), German military units gave signals with rockets: red, white and Green colour.

The command staff and members of their families in the fortress believed that the teaching of the German troops was taking place, no precautions were taken by the command of the Brest garrison.

The commanders and members of their families thought that this exercise was carried out in the German army in the same way as in our army, which was allegedly supposed to be held in the 20s dates of this month.

After the signals on the enemy side at 1-2 am in the city of Brest, all communications were broken, apparently by a saboteur group. [...]

Unrest of a counter-revolutionary nature and other manifestations on the part of military personnel and members of their families are not available.

15-year-old girls: the daughter of the deputy head of the 3rd department of the 4th army Khvalensky and the daughter of a military doctor of the 2nd rank Orlovsev ran away from their families to the Kobrin hospital to help wounded soldiers.

There are no medicines in hospitals, especially bandages, local doctors work without military supervision. The fighters of the Brest garrison, who went out on alarm, had a stock of cartridges of 15 pieces, having used them up, they retreated to the Zhabinka area in disorder, as there was no ammunition.

Communication between railway stations from Kobrin to Art. Mikashevichi is missing.

The behavior of the local Polish population towards the Red Army and their families is mostly hostile. Yes, in the mountains. Brest, they offered armed resistance, shot from the windows or threw stones and sticks.

There is no fight against such manifestations, since there are no instructions.

In the region of mountains. Gorodets, east of the mountains. Kobrin, a local Polish fist with a machine gun raided an auxiliary recovery train, which was traveling from Pinsk to restore the path from the bombardment" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 243, 248 - 249.].

On June 26, the head of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, Major of State Security A.N. Mikheev, sent a report to the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, army commissar of the 1st rank L. rifle division comrade. Markeev, the situation in the Slutsk-Bobruisk region is catastrophic.

Today at 10.00 the advanced detachments of the enemy occupied the city of Slutsk. There is nothing to oppose tanks and aircraft. Valuables fall into the hands of enemies. The command was lost.

Asks for urgent action. He believes that a dozen 2-3 tanks and aircraft will be required to restore the situation" [Ibid. L. 1.].

On June 29, the 3rd Directorate of the NPO prepared special report No. 35887, which stated that "according to the head of the 3rd department of the Western Front, major of state security comrade. Begma, the situation on the Western Front continues to remain the same.

The bulk of the fighters, commanders, including those who fled from the front, express readiness to fight with the enemy, to defend the homeland.

Among the command staff, mainly students, questions arose about where our aviation is, where are anti-tank weapons, why the Nazis can shoot us with impunity from the air.

The same mood is expressed by Major General Ermakov, the commanders of the 2nd Rifle Corps Pern, Volkov and others.

Energetic actions in the direction of Minsk-Borisov Corps Commissar Susaykov, with the participation of workers of the 3rd department of the front, the main flow of servicemen who fled from the front was stopped.

Spare parts are formed and sent to the front, but these units are not provided with sufficient equipment: there is no anti-aircraft, anti-tank artillery, tanks. Without equipping this technician, the morale of the troops is low.

Due to the lack of effective communications, command and control of troops has not yet been established. Unit commanders independently make decisions about engaging in combat, impose it on the enemy, without knowing who is on their flank.

With the suspension of the movement of the enemy, the panic mood fell, but it may reappear at the slightest success of the enemy.

The apparatus of the 3rd department of the Western Front is aimed at restoring order on front and strengthening the morale of the fighters" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 139 - 140.].

As indicated in the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36026 dated June 30 on the situation on the Western Front, "during the offensive of the German troops, a group of saboteurs from among the local Poles attacked an ammunition depot. The group consisted of 6 people armed with grenades and revolvers. All members of the group were detained and shot" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 294.].

According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36701 dated July 5, "The 3rd Department of the Western Front reported a number of facts that had a negative impact on the course of combat operations of our troops in the first days of the war on the Western Front.

The Military Council of the Western Special Military District, the command of the armies and individual military formations, in preparing units for combat operations with the enemy, showed disorganization.

By the beginning of hostilities, parts of the district were not fully provided with materiel, weapons, ammunition, food and other types of supplies.

On June 21, the commander of the 3rd Army Kuznetsov, together with Lieutenant General from the General Staff of the Red Army Karbyshevsh, watched the units located on the border. The deputy commander of the artillery regiment of the 56th Infantry Division, Major Dyurba, reported that there was a large concentration of German troops on the border, that our fortified points were not provided with ammunition and, in the event of an attack, would turn out to be incapable of combat. Dyurba Kuznetsov replied to this report: "There is nothing terrible and cannot be." Kuznetsov did not take any measures to provide points with ammunition.



After the invasion of the fascist troops, Dyurba said among the command staff:  
"Kuznetsov and the command of the 3rd Army sold us."

444th heavy corps artillery regiment, located on the border, no ammunition had, while there was enough ammunition in the warehouses of Grodno and Lida.

When moving away from the border, the regiment left 3 152-mm guns, 2 tractors and 2 cars.

Parts of the 38th Panzer Division on June 23 went in the direction of the mountains. Baranovichi was not provided with materiel, ammunition and weapons, in particular, the motorized rifle regiment left without artillery, which was handed over for repairs.

The corps units of the 2nd Rifle Corps before entering the battle on the night of June 26 were not fully equipped with materiel, and therefore on the day of entry into battle in the 151st Corps Artillery Regiment, only 2 division.

127th separate engineer battalion of the 4th rifle corps at the beginning of the military actions had only 30 rifles. The battalion lost up to 70% of its personnel. [...]

The military formations of the 4th Army on June 26 were defeated by the enemy. To repel the onslaught of the enemy and to support the actions of rifle units, the 4th Army did not have aviation and tanks. Artillery was destroyed by the enemy.

Command and control of the troops by the leading staffs with the outbreak of hostilities was unsatisfactory.

Due to the frequent bombardments of the mountains. In Minsk, the headquarters of the ZapOVO was evacuated from the city to the forest, to the Uruchcha region. The evacuation of the departments of the headquarters took place randomly, the employees of the headquarters in groups of 20-30 people for 10 hours or more were looking for a new deployment of the headquarters. The leading employees of the departments, instead of organizing the evacuation, took up the removal of their families from the city, allowing panic and confusion.

Due to the lack of communication with the units, the artillery supply of the district did not know the consumption and the need for ammunition in the active units, as a result, it did not provide them with ammunition.

On June 22-23, the artillery supply of the district was supposed to send 3 echelons of ammunition to the active armies, but due to the fault of the workers of the artillery supply, the ammunition was not sent.

The intelligence department of the front headquarters lost all its units - reconnaissance points and 2 radio divisions, and did not take measures to search. He did not start organizing partisan detachments behind enemy lines. I did not know the location of the enemy and the situation. In the early days of hostilities, intelligence reports were compiled based on materials from the Air Force, the operations department of the headquarters, and old undercover materials.

The panic that began after the unexpected invasion of German troops assumed wide proportions. The soldiers and commanders of the units of the 3rd Army disorganized, disorganized, retreated along all roads in the direction of Minsk. Many of them on the second line of defense were looking for their units and, not finding them, turned to the unit commanders with a request to accept them into the unit for further struggle against the German fascists. The commanders of the units refused to enlist these fighters in their units, citing the fact that "there is nothing to feed them."

Data from the 3rd Division of the Western Front on July 4 indicate that disorganization in parts of the front continues.

9 transports of weapons unloaded in the area of the operating units were not found, and it was not established by whom they were received. The artillery administration sent messengers to search for this weapon.

Communication with parts of the front, lost from the first days of hostilities, is not restored. The communication department does not deal with the correction of damaged lines. There is also no radio communication with the headquarters of the formations. The central radio center due to

failure of two PAT-type radios cannot work smoothly. Communication is carried out only through delegates.

The 74th Aviation Regiment lost the encryption tools and the OK-40 cipher.

The enemy uses our code 16 hours RAP for provocative purposes. Received two telegrams of a provocative nature without address and signature, encrypted with the specified code.

The General Staff gave an order to change the code 16 hours of the RAP" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 204 - 207.].

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 4/37175 dated July 8, "according to the report of the 3rd department of the Western Front, as of July 1, there were the following significant shortcomings.

There was no sufficient number of artillery shells and other ammunition.

The supply of parts of the front with ammunition from the beginning of hostilities took place from big interruptions.

On the part of the Front Artistic Directorate, represented by Lieutenant General Cry effective no measures were taken to streamline the supply of ammunition to the units.

The shells available in the 28th Rifle Corps were not put on alert (the fuses were not turned); most of the mines that arrived in the unit did not have fuses.

During the evacuation of the anti-aircraft division of military unit 1822 from the mountains. Grodno, due to the lack of traction, the material part remained unremoved. The division did not show proper resistance to the enemy, since it was not provided with shells.

The 56th Rifle Division was not prepared for battle - the mortar platoon did not have mines, the regimental school of the 37th Rifle Corps did not have rifles and cartridges. Parts of the division entered the battle with peacetime weapons and ammunition.

The 27th Rifle Division was also brought into battle unprepared - there were not enough shells and cartridges.

The advanced units located on the border were not provided with weapons and ammunition, as a result, at the first appearance of the enemy, they fled, creating panic in the main parts of the 3rd Army.

The supply of units of the 85th Infantry Division with fuel, ammunition and food was delivered extremely poorly. Already on the third day of the battle, the artillery regiments of the division had no shells.

By the beginning of hostilities, the 24th separate mortar battalion was provided with rifles by half, had no grenades and mines at all. For this reason, the battalion did not enter into battle with the enemy, and when leaving the military town of Kozekov (near Minsk), it left up to 30 mortars and over a thousand mines on the territory of the town.

Of the 12 ammunition depots in the district, 6 were destroyed by explosion, which is 24.5% of the total stock.

In corps artillery units of the 28th Rifle Corps and regiments of the RGC the shells are running out and the units don't know where to get them.

The shells brought in on June 26 turned out to be without fuses. Part of the 3rd Army in the area of Molodechno - Krulevshchina had no ammunition.

The 6th mechanized corps, located in the Baranovichy region and cut off from the front, was not provided with ammunition.

Since the beginning of hostilities in the work of the VOSO department, there has been a large fuzziness.

When sending vehicles with ammunition, the numbering and departure station of the transport was often absent, which led to the disruption of the timely supply of ammunition on the front line.

The Department of Military Communications of the Red Army did not report the number trains with ammunition sent from the central warehouse.

The supply of fuel and lubricants to parts of the front was extremely disorganized.

Lubricants R-9, diesel fuel and autol in parts were running out. The application of the OSG front dated June 23 for the shipment of the R-9 by the Fuel Supply Directorate of the Red Army by July 1 was not fulfilled. Lubricants and fuel shipped for parts of the front in the period from June 23 to June 30 arrived in small quantities, which in no way met the needs of the front, and certain types of lubricants and fuel did not arrive at all.

On June 29, the front commander ordered the transfer of fuel for the front on transport aircraft.

The fulfillment of this task was entrusted to the representative of the ABT front, Captain Sorokin, and the head of the OSG department, military engineer of the 3rd rank Ponomarev, who, due to a disagreement between themselves, did not deliver fuel to the airfield in the required quantity, as a result, only 3 out of 22 transport aircraft were loaded, the rest left unloaded.

The heads of individual warehouses, in a panic before the enemy, set fire to the warehouses, and deserted themselves.

The head of the fuel depot No. 497 in the city of Orsha, quartermaster of the 3rd rank Tregubov and pompolit - battalion commissar Pivovarov, in a panic, set fire to warehouse No. 497 in the city of Orsha, while they themselves deserted. Burned 700 tons of gasoline and 6 wagons of lubricants and oils.

Tregubov and Pivovarov were brought to trial by the Military Tribunal.

Head of fuel and lubricants warehouse No. 645 at station. Horodishche - quartermaster of the 2nd rank May on June 26 burned down the warehouse, and deserted himself.

On this fact, the 3rd department of the front is investigating.

There was no supply of front units along the quartermaster's line established.

Due to the lack of communication between the Front Directorate and the quartermasters of armies, corps and individual military formations, the Quartermaster's Directorate did not know about the situation with food and other types of property.

As of July 1, the head food depots had not yet been formed and had not been thrown out to the front line.

There were no motor battalions at the disposal of the Quartermaster's Office, and therefore the transfer of food to the advanced units of the front was extremely difficult. There were no other means of transport available.

The Military Council of the front was instructed to immediately form 10 autobattalions in order to use them to deliver artillery supplies, fuel and food to parts of the front, but the autobattalions were not created.

The situation of the front with hospitals is very difficult.

The mobilization of sanitary institutions according to the deployment scheme on the territory of the Western Special Military District was disrupted. In addition, the Minsk, Molodechno, Volkovysk and Kobrin military hospitals were destroyed, so there was nowhere to treat the wounded" [Ibid. L. 187 - 190.].

On July 13, 1941, having left the encirclement, the head of the 3rd department of the 10th army, regimental commissar Los, sent a report to the head of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO, in which he wrote: "According to your order, I report the situation in which the events began and their development. On June 21, at 24:00, a member of the Military Council called me and asked me to come to headquarters. Arriving at the army headquarters, the commander of the 10th Army, Major General Golubev, said that the situation was extremely tense and there was an order from the district to the leadership staff to wait for orders without leaving the apparatus.

In turn, by this time all the commanders of corps and divisions were called to the wire and were waiting for orders.

At about 1 a.m. on June 22, Pavlov, the former commander of the ZapOVO, called HF and ordered the troops to be put on full alert and said that he would give the details in cipher. In accordance with this, instructions were given to all unit commanders. At about 3 o'clock all means of communication were cut off. I believe that before the start of the bombing, paratroopers were dropped by the enemy and they removed all means of communication.

By 10-11 o'clock in the morning, the encryption arrived, I don't remember its exact content now, but I remember well that it said to put the troops on combat readiness, not to succumb to provocations and not to cross the state border. By this time, the enemy troops had already penetrated into our territory in places by 5-10 km. The encryption was signed by Pavlov, Fomin, Klimovskikh. [...]

At 8 o'clock in the morning the command post moved near vil. Staroseltsy in the forest, which is 5 km northwest of Bialystok. Immediately, the command took measures to establish communication between the formations, and by 12 o'clock communication with them was restored by the delegates. Radio communication was restored by the end of the 22nd, both with the district and with all connections. Communication wire during the actions of the army is not restored.

On the 22nd and 23rd, all units conducted intensified military operations against the enemy. In some places (86th, 113th rifle divisions) went on the counteroffensive. By the evening of the 22nd, I don't remember now from whom, either from the deputy commander of the ZapOVO Boldin personally, or from the headquarters of the ZapOVO, an order was received to retreat and gain a foothold at the turn of the Narev River. The order was caused by the alleged forfeit of the neighbor on the left - the 3rd Army.

On the evening of the 22nd, the army command post moved near st. Vallyy, east of Bialystok, units were completing their retreat across the Narew River.

Due to the fact that the retreat was carried out during the day, the enemy aircraft acted with complete impunity, since not a single of our aircraft was there, they bombed and shot the departing units from the aircraft. All the following days, enemy aircraft, with complete impunity, shot with bombs of various calibers and machine-gun fire from aircraft both forward units and all troops of the army, preventing our troops from raising their heads. In addition, the advancing enemy troops fired heavily from flamethrowers, which we did not have at all.

Enemy aircraft took control of all highways, shot down cars, and subsequently even hunted individual people, which created great panic and a large number of people fled, throwing weapons, materiel and ammunition on the move.

The Bialystok-Volkovysk highway was filled with corpses of people, cars, tanks, ammunition, and it was absolutely impossible to get through it.

Thus, in essence, the defeated units entered the Narew River, having a very small number of people in the divisions, and such formations as the 13th MK remained with only one headquarters. This happened because the corps was formed as a mechanized corps by the beginning of hostilities and did not receive the materiel, not counting a small part of the training tanks. The regiments were armed with 200-300 rifles, the rest of the personnel were unarmed.

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that, by order of the district headquarters, from May 15, all artillery regiments of divisions, corps and artillery regiments of the RGK were assembled in camps in two places - Chervony Bor (between Lomzha and Zambrovo) of the 22nd regiment of the 10th army and Obuz -Forest artillery regiments of the rear divisions of the army and other parts of the district. To raise these regiments, the chief of artillery of the army, Major General Barsukov, was sent, who, as he told me, managed to get to the regiments at 6 o'clock in the morning, wake them up, alert them and send them to divisions. This was already at a time when all the border divisions were fighting the enemy.

The mechanized artillery regiments found themselves in an exceptionally difficult situation. Some of the guns, having no tractors, were left in winter quarters, some of the tractors in the camps were also out of order, and the command of the units blew up or abandoned this material part without firing a single shot at the enemy from them. On the road, during the retreat, due to damage to the tractors from the bombing, perfectly serviceable guns were thrown, even the locks were not always removed.

A similar situation was also with anti-aircraft artillery. All divisions and regiments, in any case, the entire main commanding staff and materiel, were collected for camp training in the Krupki town, near Minsk, and until recently they did not return to the 10th Army, and their fate is unknown to me. Thus, formations, warehouses, cities were left without anti-aircraft artillery.

The 6th mechanized corps, commanded by Major General Khatskilevich, was fully equipped with new materiel, KB and T-34 tanks, was held in reserve by the command of the 10th Army and was scheduled for a counterattack. On June 22, Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Boldin arrived, and on the 23rd, Marshal Kulik. Both left for the 6th Corps and [he] was sent by them to the junction of the 3rd Army in the Sokolka area - The forge where the enemy managed to break through. The corps left the subordination of the 10th Army, it was commanded by Boldin and Kulik. The corps was in an extremely difficult situation due to the lack of fuel and shells. The fuel supply base was in Volkovysk, that is, more than 100 km from the corps. All measures were taken to supply fuel, but dispatch was hampered by the fact that movement was possible only at night, that is, within 4-5 hours. During this time, it was necessary to clear the road from traffic jams after the bombing.

The troops resisted the enemy until the 26th, after which they began a disorderly retreat. The command post of the army was moved to the Castle Forest, which is northeast of the mountains. Volkovysk. The commanders of formations began to arrive at the command post with reports on the state of the troops, from which it was clear that 500-600 people remained from the division, the rest of the staff was killed or fled.

The following contributed to the spread of panic and increased disorder in the rear.

On the night of June 22-23, the entire party and Soviet leadership of the Bialystok region shamefully fled. All employees of the NKVD and NKGB bodies, headed by the heads of the bodies, also fled. A similar situation took place in almost all district and city organizations. All the militia fled from Bialystok and other cities. Cities, and in particular Bialystok, as the nearest supply base, were left without power. The hostile elements took advantage of this and raised their heads. More than 3,000 detainees were released from prisons, who began looting and pogroms in the city. Hostile elements opened fire from windows at the passing units and rear of our troops, using for this hidden weapons of the former Polish army and abandoned by our parts.

All this made it possible for small enemy landings of 10-15 people to induce panic with impunity and create an impression of the environment, since their destruction was not organized.

On June 22, 1941, in the evening at the command post, I made a proposal, in view of the inability to try the arrested and evacuate them, to shoot all spies, rebels, saboteurs and traitors, to draw up an act signed by the Secretary of the Regional Committee Comrade. Kudryaev, head of the UNKVD comrade Fukin, NKGB comrade Belchenko and mine. This proposal was made by me in the presence of Lieutenant General Bogdanov and Sokolov, who supported me. Tov. Kudryaev and Belchenko promised to think over this proposal and inform me of the result on the 23rd. As I indicated above, on the 23rd they all fled from Bialystok.

A similar situation took place in all other districts and cities. The population, both in the western regions and in the eastern ones, now occupied by the enemy, was not organized to fight the landings and counter-revolutionary elements.

The Military Council of the Army decided on a further retreat and (since the headquarters of the 10th Army was cut off from Volkovysk from the west and Slonim from the east by parachute assault) bypass country roads from the northeast and reach Baranovichi.

As it turned out later, Baranovichi was taken by the Germans, after which the Military Council decided to retreat east in the direction of Slutsk. It turned out that these escape routes were also cut off by the Germans.

Crossing the highway [at] Baranovichi met with the enemy, accepted the battle. Prior to this, the commander warned me that it was decided to break up into groups, and the group, including the leadership of the army headquarters, would go along with Marshal Kulik and drive forward in passenger cars. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Kulik ordered me to go with him. The remaining operational staff, under the leadership of my deputy, together with the rest of the command staff of the army headquarters and under the leadership of the army commander, General Golubev, were to make their way in the same direction.

Since the 30th, I have no information about them.

The group in which I was, 24 people, made their way in cars along a country road to the old border in the area southwest of Minsk. After it turned out that Minsk was occupied by the enemy, it was decided to make their way to the Berezina. Divided into groups of 5-6 people, following the same direction 5-6 km from each other, they made their way to the Berezina, but the Berezina turned out to be occupied by the enemy, after which it was decided to move to the Dnieper.

July 9, 1941 in the evening we reached the Dnieper, north of Novy Bykhov against vil. Selets. In the evening, the Dnieper sailed on a raft made of logs and were detained by an order of the 183rd division.

Our entire journey passed along a low-traffic road, a country road, swamps, and forests. Avoiding entering large villages and villages, with preliminary reconnaissance they entered only small settlements. The highway, along which the enemy forces were moving, was crossed by us, as a rule, at night in between the movement of vehicles.

#### About the work of the 3rd department

Immediately after the bombing, all the documents of the 3rd department were handed over to the regional Management of the NKVD to deliver them to Minsk.

The 3rd department had to deal with everything, and mainly to ensure the work of the rear.

The 3rd department of the army from the outgoing border guards of 200 people, under the leadership of the operational staff, detachments were created, detaining all the fugitives and directing them to the points where regiments were formed by the army headquarters and sent to the front. A purge of people passing through detachments was organized, an investigation was conducted on deserters, marauders, spies and alarmists.

The operational staff was sent to all the main decisive points, to which groups of border guards and commanders were attached.

In addition, due to the fact that from 22 on the night of 23 all the employees of the NKVD and the NKGB, the party and Soviet apparatuses fled from Bialystok, the city was left without power, and since Bialystok was still a supply base for our units, I formed the task force under the commandant of the city, reinforced by border guards, order was restored in Bialystok using all wartime measures.

On the 25th - 26th, the task force left Bialystok only when, from On the western side of it, the Germans began to enter.

Walking for 10 days through the territory of the enemy, entering individual villages, I observed the following.

A large number of Red Army soldiers who have abandoned their weapons roam the villages, are not detained by German troops, are not taken prisoner. In some cases, these groups are used by the Germans for work (building houses, clearing roads, etc.). The command staff is shot on the spot by any rank of the German army, as soon as it is established that this person belongs to the command staff. The civilian population is not touched. Representatives of the German command visited individual villages and offered to leave the existing order, not to dissolve the collective farms, especially pressing for the harvest to be harvested in an organized manner.

It should be noted that, as a rule, the district party and Soviet leadership fled from all places 5-6 days before the appearance of the enemy, leaving the entire collective-farm Soviet asset of the village without leadership.

In addition, in the pre-war period, all radios were confiscated, so that the collective farmers did not know the instructions of the Soviet government about the destruction of all property upon departure. They also do not know about the creation of partisan detachments. During at least 10 days of advancing through the territory of the enemy, I did not see a single case of destruction of property and did not hear about partisan detachments. There were cases when the peasants of the villages dismantled the property belonging to the state farm and the state. In some collective farms, individual farmers terrorized the collective farmers and began to rob collective farm property.

Speaking about the behavior of commanders walking in a group during the exit from the encirclement, it should be noted that basically everyone went with the decision to either get through to their own people or die.

The behavior of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Kulik is incomprehensible. He ordered everyone to remove their insignia, throw away their documents, then change into peasant clothes and change into peasant clothes himself. He himself did not have any documents with him, I do not know if he took them with him from Moscow. He offered to drop weapons, and personally orders and documents for me, however, except for his adjutant, a major in rank, I forgot his last name, no one threw documents and weapons. He motivated this by the fact that if we get caught by the enemy, he will take us for peasants and let us go.

Just before crossing the front, Comrade Kulik rode in a peasant cart along the very road along which the German tanks were moving, which was well known to Comrade. Kulik in the footsteps of German cars (they differ from ours) and according to the stories of the peasants, and only a happy accident saved us from meeting with the Germans. Marshal tov. Kulik said that he knew how to swim well, but he did not swim across the river, but waited for a raft to be put together" [Ibid. L. 330 - 340.].

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Similar problems occurred in the troops **of the Southwestern Front**. On June 22, "according to the report of the 3 [th] department of the 139th division of the KOVO, parts of the division are moving towards their starting position. Division vehicles without spare parts and without rubber. The shells were left in winter quarters. There is a great shortage of shoes in the division, 200 people are completely barefoot. The division is not mobilized" [Ibid. D. 98. L. 175.].

As indicated in the special message of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36137 dated July 1, "according to the report of the 3rd [th] department of the South-Western Front dated June 25 with. During the deployment of hostilities in the first days of the war, disorganization, carelessness and confusion were noted in parts of the front.

Despite signals about the real possibility of an enemy attack, individual commanders of units of the Southwestern Front were unable to quickly repel the enemy attack. [...]

By the beginning of hostilities, the district headquarters was not in place. Headquarters departments followed in scattered echelons and arrived at the command post from Kyiv by the end of June 22. The headquarters had no regular communication with the armies and corps.

On the first day of the war, the command of the 5th Army lost contact with the units and did not know the situation at the front.

On June 22, the commander of the 5th Army ordered that the command post be changed. The heads of departments were not warned about the place of the new concentration. The move took place in an unorganized manner, the columns stretched out, were discovered by enemy aircraft and fired upon by it.

Anti-aircraft artillery of the 18th anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the 12th army, guarding the mountains. Stanislav from enemy air raids, did not have 37-mm shells. Also, the artillery battalions of units, in particular 164- and rifle division.

In some cities that were bombed, party and Soviet the workers were the first to run, which created panic and confusion.

June 22 p. after the bombing of the city of Lutsk by the enemy, the entire party and Soviet apparatus left the city in a panic. The detainees who remained in the Lutsk prison rebelled, disarmed part of the guards and tried to escape. (The riot was soon put down.)

On June 22, after the first raid by German bombers, panic began in Lvov. Party and Soviet workers of regional organizations mobilized all Lvov vehicles, gathered their families and began to leave the city in large parties.

On June 23, there was actually no power in Lvov. This was taken advantage of by a bandit element, which at night plundered a confectionery factory, some trading enterprises and apartments of evacuated families. Water was poisoned at the Lvov Meat Processing Plant.

In the transit prison in Lvov, the captives revolted, disarming part of the guards. The rebellion was suppressed by the escort battalion of the NKVD troops.

Created on the orders of the commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General Muzychenko, an operational group of workers from the 3rd Army Department and the Political Propaganda Department in Lvov, by June 24, revolutionary order was restored. Organized barrage points began to return refugees back to Lvov.

On June 23, the first secretary of the Bussk district committee of the CP (b) U, Bezukhov, and the chairman of the executive committee, Popov, fled from the town of Buek, leaving the area without any leadership. (Both are arrested.)

The political and moral state of the front units is healthy, with the exception of individual cases of unhealthy moods and desertion.

June 22 this year Chief of Artillery of the 12th Army, Major General Gavrilenko, said: "The Germans will start advancing and beat us. Everything that was taken in 1939 will be taken away. We have ugliness at every step. In the 16th mechanized corps, shells do not fit the gun system, it is impossible to shoot. In the artillery brigades there is nothing to carry the materiel. The Germans will take us away like chickens, without firing a shot."

On June 23, an employee of the artillery department of the 12th Army, Major Serofanov, said: "We were beaten, they beat and will beat because of disorganization, lack of discipline and order."

On June 26, 69 deserters were detained in parts of the South-Western Front, including 3 officers. Of the detainees, 32 people were shot by the command, 2 were sentenced to death by the Military Tribunal, and the rest are being investigated by the military prosecutor's office.



For the period from June 24 to June 26, 450 Red Army soldiers were picked up who had lost their parts.

To detain deserters and those who lost their units, special barriers were created by the 3rd department of the Southwestern Front.

In a battle with the enemy units of the 97th Infantry Division, a group of German soldiers was captured. By examining the weapons taken from them, it was found that the Nazi Germans were actively fighting, the barrels of their rifles were very hot, the rifles of prisoners from Austrians, Czechs and other nationalities remained oiled, since not a single shot was fired from them » [Ibid. L. 250 - 253.].

According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 36698 dated July 6, "according to the 3rd department of the Southwestern Front, the first days of the war with Germany showed that a number of units of the KOVO were not prepared for military operations. The units and formations lacked the required amount of ammunition and weapons, the relationship between the units was poorly established, among the highest commanding staff there were cases of alarmism. All this led to heavy losses of personnel and weapons.

Due to the lack of ammunition, part of the 9th [So in the text. This refers to the defensive structures of the 13th Kovel UR.] The UR (5th Army of the city of Lyuboml) suffered heavy losses with the outbreak of hostilities and on the second day of the war they were forced to go to the front lines of the field units. The artillery of the UR did not enter firing positions due to the lack of shells.

The army command, having inaccurate data on the location of its units and on the movement of enemy units, often issues incorrect orders and orders.

On June 24, the chief of staff of the army, based on unverified intelligence from the army headquarters that 30 enemy tanks, artillery and 18 armored vehicles were moving in the area of the Dubenskaya road, which supposedly bypassed the German 14th tank division on the right, was ordered to prepare for evacuation.

As a result of the check, these data were not confirmed, and the given order caused a panic among the command staff of the army headquarters.

On June 23 and 24, the local authorities of Lvov and Lutsk began to leave these cities in disorder, causing panic among the population. By the measures taken by the 3rd Division and the command of the 5th Army, the panic was quickly eliminated.

On June 26, in connection with the alleged approach of the Germans, a panic was created in the very headquarters of the Southwestern Front. The investigation established that the deputy chief of staff for political affairs, regimental commissar Zinoviev, received an order from the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Purkaev, to prepare the vehicles and load department property on them. The order was carried out. As a result, the head of the commissary service department, Major General Kovalev, the head of the OSG, Major General Alekseev and others, from 3 o'clock on June 26, curtailed the work of their departments.

In addition, on the orders of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics Trutko, 100 trucks were taken to load the property of the headquarters, designed to transport fuel to the 15th mechanized corps fighting the enemy.

The measures taken by the 3rd Division and the Military Council of the Southwestern front, the work of the departments of the headquarters was restored.

The command post of the headquarters of the armkavgroup is poorly organized: there are no dugouts, the guards are few in number and consist of poorly trained fighters. On the night of June 24-25, aimless fire was raised by the guard guarding the command post, which was stopped only in the morning.

Armgroup's supply station is not organized. Headquarters employees do not leave in part for assistance and operational guidance" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 112 - 114.].

As noted in the special report of the Special Department of the NKVD No. 4 / 38578 dated July 21, "according to the Special Department of the Southwestern Front, an investigation into the circumstances of the departure of units of the 199th Infantry Division from the battlefield in the N[ovy] Miropol area

It was established that since July 5 this year, units of the division, according to the order of the front command, took up defense in the southern sector of the N[ovograd]-Volyn fortified area, in particular, in the Borintsy-N[ovyy] Miropol-Korostki sector.

Due to the lack of leadership in the battle on the part of the division command and the premature abandonment of points by the UR units, when the enemy broke through on July 6 of this year. of the fortified area N[ovyy] Miropol, the 7th Infantry Regiment of the division retreated from their positions in a panic.

After this breakthrough by division control, communication with two regiments was lost.

July 9 this year division commander Alekseev, having a written order from the Military Council of the front to hold their positions, on the basis of an alleged oral order from the commander of the 7th rifle corps Dobro-serdov, the 492nd rifle regiment, which had all the possibilities to hold the line defenses until reinforcements arrived, ordered to withdraw. The rest of the regiments this order was not transmitted.

Division commander Alekseev, together with Commissar Korzhev and others commanders, leaving units, fled from the battlefield.

In the area where the headquarters of the division was located on July 11, everything was found abandoned clerical work of the headquarters division and about 2 million money.

The investigation into the case is being conducted by the Special Department of the Front. On July 22, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, imposed the following resolution on this report: "T. Nosov, copy to Comrade Mekhlis. Immediately arrest the corps commander, division commander, regimental commanders and judge as soon as possible as traitors and cowards" [Ibid. D.100. L.252 - 253.].

On August 17, the Special Department of the NKVD prepared special report No. 41/103, which stated that "On July 6, the 199th Infantry Division was defeated near Novo-Miropol, having suffered heavy losses in people and materiel.

In connection with this, the Special Department of the South-Western Front conducted an investigation, as a result of which it was established:

On June 30, the commander of the Southwestern Front ordered the 199th Infantry Division to occupy and firmly hold the southern front of the Novograd-Volyn fortified area by the morning of July 5. The command of the division complied with this order belatedly. Parts of the division took up defense later than the specified period, in addition, during the march, food was not organized for the fighters. People, especially the 617th Infantry Regiment, arrived at the defense area exhausted.

After occupying the defense area, the command of the division did not reconnoiter the enemy forces, did not take measures to blow up the bridge across the Sluch River in the central defense sector, which made it possible for the enemy to transfer tanks and motorized infantry. Due to the fact that the command did not establish a connection between the division headquarters and the regiments, on July 6 the 617th and 584th rifle regiments acted without any guidance from the command divisions.

During the panic created in the units during the enemy offensive, the command failed to prevent the flight that had begun. The divisional headquarters fled. Division commander Alekseev, deputy commander for political affairs Korzhev and division chief of staff German left the regiments and fled to the rear with the remnants of the headquarters.

Through the fault of Korzhev and German, party documents, blank forms of party cards, seals of the party and Komsomol organizations and all staff documents were left to the enemy.

The commander of the division, Colonel Alekseev, the deputy commander for political affairs, the regimental commissar Korzhev, and the chief of staff of the division, Lieutenant Colonel German, were arrested and tried by the Military Tribunal" [Ibid. D. 101. L. 110 - 111.].

As noted in the special report of the Special Department of the NKVD No. 4/51973 dated November 20, 1941, "according to the Special Department of the NKVD of the Southern Front, the former assistant chief of staff for intelligence of the 396th returned from the enemy's encirclement

Rifle Regiment of the 135th Rifle Division of the 27th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army, Senior Lieutenant Kudakov reported the following.

From the first days of the war, the 135th Rifle Division in the area of the Vladimir-Volyn direction was defeated and was sent to Shepetovka for reorganization.

In connection with the available data on the death of the division commander, Major General Smekhotvortsev, Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky was appointed commander of the newly formed 135th Rifle Division.

As it turned out later, the information about the death of Major General Smekhotvortsev was false. In fact, Major General Smekhotvortsev, together with the chief of staff of the division, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhailov, in a place east of the mountains. Korosten collected units that had left the battle and formed a division from them, and there were more personnel and weapons in these units than in the newly formed 135th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky.

Upon formation, the Dubrovsky division was deployed 20 kilometers west of st. Full for defense.

Somewhat later, the division was again transferred to the old UR on the Sluch River near the town of Baranovka, where units of the division occupied the defense area along the eastern bank of the Sluch River.

A few days later, Dubrovsky's division and the 149th division operating to the left the infantry division was in the enemy's half-ring.

There was time to withdraw, since there was no enemy division in the defense area, but the withdrawal for unknown reasons was not organized by the command of the division.

On July 7, Major General Smekhotvortsev sent an order to withdraw the remnants of the division Dubrovsky to the place of formation of units by Major General Smekhotvortsev.

Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky did not comply with this order and did not let three lieutenants and one captain sent by Smekhotvortsev with six junior commanders back.

The political instructor of the Special Branch of the division Pashyuta, who left on the same day to Major General Smekhotvortsev, returned to the division on July 8 and brought confirmation of Smekhotvortsev's order, but Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky refused to carry it out for the second time.

Discontent began to grow among the command staff. In fact, there were two 135th Infantry Division.

During this time, the enemy continued to bypass the division, and by July 10 the latter was completely surrounded.

In this regard, at a meeting of the command staff, it was decided to break up the division into three groups and start exiting the encirclement of each group independently.

However, not a single group succeeded in breaking through the enemy ring. At the site of the planned breakthrough near the village of Stribezh, Zhytomyr region, through the Kiev highway, reconnaissance discovered a large movement of motorized parts to Zhitomir.

The units of the two groups of the division gathered near the village of Stribezh were 2 km from the enemy. There was no one from the command of the division, Lieutenant Colonel Dubrovsky, leaving his units, left at night in an unknown direction.

The remaining commanding staff decided to bury the excess weapons and ammunition in the ground, divide the people into small groups and go across the highway in the direction of Kyiv.

After this decision, the existing 3 cars were rendered unusable, horses with carts were transferred to a collective farm in the village of Stribezh. The personnel broke up into small groups, many commanders went with their units.

As a result, only a few servicemen returned from the encirclement" [There same. D. 103. L. 388 - 389.].

According to the special report of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO No. 38209 dated July 18, "the command of the 25th mechanized corps of the Kharkov military district on June 24

1941 received an order to send the corps to the active army, with a loading date on the same day by 23 o'clock.

The corps administration and separate corps units left Kharkov on June 24, 1941 by rail, followed through Poltava, Kremenchug, Znamenka to the station. Mironovka, from where they arrived on their own in the city of Boguslav and became part of the 19th Army.

From the city of Boguslav, the control of the corps on its own through Tarashcha, the city of Belaya Tserkov, the city of Vasilkovo arrived in the village. Glevakha, Vasilkovsky district, Kyiv region, from there the next day it was relocated to the village. Svyatoshino near Kyiv, and then on their own to the station. Irpin, 15 km from Kyiv, where they plunged into the railway echelon, which through the station. On the night of July 5, 1941, Nizhyn and Gomel arrived in the city of Novozybkov, Orel Region, and were placed at the disposal of the 5th Army.

The corps spent 10 days on all the crossings listed above, wasting motor resources aimlessly, and lost corps units along the way, that is, a motorcycle regiment, a separate engineering battalion, etc.

From the 50th Panzer Division, which made an almost similar route, it is not known where the 4 echelons are located and the 4 echelons of the 219th Motorized Division are in the same position, which, in addition, during the crossings lost 150 personnel killed and wounded, hitting under bombardment by enemy aircraft at st. Vasilkovo before unloading the train.

It would take only 1 - 1.5 days to move from Kharkov (the former place of deployment) to Novozybkov, therefore, the time lost on moving from one place to another could be used to obtain the missing materiel and weapons, which the corps has not yet been completed and therefore has not been brought to full combat readiness" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 352 - 353.].

According to the special report of the Special Department of the NKVD No. 39405 of August 1, "From the first days of the war, the 4th mechanized corps was used by the command of the 6th army as part of a cover.

In battles with the enemy, the corps lost 27 KB tanks and 174 T-34 tanks, in addition, 133 tanks of these brands were lost due to technical malfunctions.

Most of these losses occurred through the fault of the command of the 6th Army, which transferred parts of the corps from place to place over long distances.

There were cases when the corps with its units did not have time to settle down on a new line or only approached it, as the order of the 6th Army followed with a new combat mission that caused new long-range movements (Kamenka-Strumilov, Moscisk, etc.).

Due to frequent transitions, the corps as a whole traveled 800 kilometers (and the 32nd tank division - 1000 kilometers) and was left completely without materiel.

Tanks "KB" and T-34 were thrown on the roads due to minor malfunctions. The command of the 6th Army did not carry out any work to collect the materiel left on the roads. The forces of the corps picked up and evacuated 73 tanks, blew up and burned 98 tanks.

The hull was also misused in combat operations. All the battles carried out by the divisions of the corps were not accompanied by either artillery fire or aircraft. The motorized rifle regiments attached to the tank units by the command of the 6th Army from the first day of hostilities were scattered in small units, and the 202nd and 32nd regiments were detained to guard the headquarters of the 6th Army.

The command of the 6th Army did not organize the withdrawal of the units. Formally, by order and on the maps, the movement of units was delimited, but the main routes were always excessively overloaded. There were no army traffic controllers and route commanders, as, for example, during the withdrawal from Lvov to Zlochev, when the 4th mechanized corps connected with units of the 6th rifle corps and the 3rd cavalry division and formed a many-kilometer column, creating traffic jams on the roads" [Ibid. D. 100. L. 318 - 319.].

Also on August 1, a special report was prepared by the Special Department of the NKVD, which summarized some of the results of the combat operations of the armored forces of the front. "According to the Special Department of the South-Western Front, during the past period of hostilities, tank and motorized units at the disposal of the front command suffered heavy losses of materiel.

The main reasons for the large losses of the material part are:

- 1) The cumbersome structure of the command posts, which made tactical maneuverability of armored formations;
- 2) Weak tactical and technical training of personnel, especially command;
- 3) Poor cohesion of units and subunits;
- 4) Frequent changes in concentration areas, resulting in large marches that led to severe wear of vehicles before they participated in battles (the 8th mechanized corps made a march of about 500 km before the battle, lost up to 45% of vehicles during this time ; 56- I division made a march of about 1000 km, lost up to 35% of the vehicles);
- 5) Lack of interaction with tanks of artillery, aviation and infantry and weak cover of tank formations by anti-aircraft weapons;
- 6) The lack of intelligence about the enemy and the terrain, as a result of which a significant number of tanks died in the swamps;
- 7) Lack of repair facilities, spare parts and evacuation facilities;
- 8) The manifestation of alarmism and cowardice by individual commanders.

As of July 30, G.

39 tanks remained in the 8th Panzer Division;

in the 32nd tank division - 10 tanks;

in the 20th Panzer Division - 3 tanks;

in the 35th tank division - 24 tanks;

in the 10th Panzer Division - 6 tanks;

in the 37th tank division - 7 tanks;

in the 15th tank division - 101 tanks;

in the 43rd Panzer Division - 47 tanks;

in the 40th tank division - 3 tanks;

in the 19th tank division - 1 tank;

in the 41st Panzer Division - 11 tanks;

in the 34th tank division - 3 tanks;

in the 44th Panzer Division - 125 tanks;

in the 39th Panzer Division - 0 tanks.

All the materiel remaining in parts of the front requires repair.

The remaining personnel of the 9th, 19th, 22nd and 24th corps participate in the battles like infantry units.

The 12th Panzer Division, which is currently under construction, received 75 tanks from factories and repair bases; the rest of the formed regiments have a total of 270 tanks" [Ibid. L. 315 - 317.].

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One of the activities of military counterintelligence was the recording of various "wrong" statements of the Red Army soldiers. Such materials are interesting in that they provide an opportunity to obtain information about the existing moods. At the same time, of course, it should be remembered that those recorded by the military

counterintelligence statements were precisely a noticeable deviation from the widespread ones, which made them the object of attention.

On June 22, 1941, the organs of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO recorded the following statements by military personnel. Major Mukhin, a teacher of tactics at the Higher School of Staff, believed that "now the Germans will make a meat grinder for us. We are not ready for war. Everywhere licentiousness and disorganization. According to senior lieutenant Pavlov, a student of the 2nd year of the Higher School, "Japan will not oppose us, since we bought it. After all, even Marx said that in the interests of the revolution, you can sacrifice an entire nation. The Soviet government probably promised Japan to give the opportunity to be the master in the Pacific Ocean and give China" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 1.]. Tveretinov, a Red Army soldier of the 14th Rifle Corps of the Southern Front, was sure that "Germany would defeat the Soviet Union. At the first offensive of the Germans, you need to surrender. You will stay alive there, and you will live well" [Ibid. L. 8.]. As Rodyukov, the driver of the NPO car depot, believed, "the Germans will beat us. The USSR cannot fight for a long time, because. economically the Soviet Union is very weak, it is not like the Germans. In addition, there will be great betrayals on our part, and the Germans cannot have this. No one inside the country will help us in the war, the peasants used to help, and now they will not do it either. During the Finnish events, there were many volunteers, and now no one will volunteer in the war with Germany, because. after the end of the war with Finland, those who returned from the front were not taken back to work, and many of them did not have any work for a long time" [Ibid. L. 16].

According to the engineer of the special department of the Main Military Construction Directorate Kosolapov: "Germany was smarter than the USSR in matters of preparation for war, and therefore Germany was well formed, prepared and may turn out to be the winner. One of the positive aspects in Germany is that preparatory work was and is being carried out with the reserve commanders, and in the USSR this important area of work is completely forgotten, NGOs in the war are counting on young people who are in the Red Army, this is wrong" [Ibid. L. 17.]. Mirin, a student at the Military Veterinary Academy, declared that "the German people will never go against their government, since all Germans live incomparably better than the rest of the working people of those states that Germany has enslaved. In Germany, almost every peasant has his own car and other conveniences in life" [Ibid. L. 19.]. A Red Army soldier of the 266th Corps Artillery Regiment of the 9th Army of the Southern Front, who was not named in the document, said: "Molotov said well that victory would be ours, but in fact it could be on the side of Germany. I am more confident in German technology. Then, the victory remains with those who lead the offensive first" [Ibid. L. 44.]. According to the commander of the 1st division of the 260th howitzer artillery regiment of the Northern Front, Captain Chesnokov: "This is not Finland for us, we have a liquidity, and Hitler is a strong enemy, he can tear us to shreds" [Ibid. L. 55.].

On June 23, Selyuchenko, a Red Army soldier of the 9th Army of the Southern Front, said: "My heart feels that we will be defeated, since the German army is technically strong and better trained. I was convinced today that Germany is fighting for justice, that she is not afraid of us, her planes fly freely, not afraid of our anti-aircraft artillery and planes. They do their work before our eyes, and in our newspapers there is a lot of hype about the Red Army, but on the facts something turns out differently" [Ibid. L. 45.]. As the military engineer of the 1st rank of the squadron of the 41st air division Fedorov (st. Luga) believed, "with such an organization as we have, I feel that Hitler will cover us, smash us to smithereens. Their organization is not ours. We are used to talking a lot, but in reality it's not at all the same. The authorities live, and they are not afraid of bombs. There is not much to hope for people. We have a lot of prisoners and many of them are in prison for nothing. Hitler takes this into account and will probably drop troops near the prisoner camps" [Ibid. L. 61.]. According to the military technician of the 1st rank of the scientific test range for small arms Olshansky, "the messages of our Information Bureau are not correct. Can't be

so many prisoners were taken when our troops in some places had to retreat and even surrender cities. Our losses are probably greater than the Germans - both manpower and machines "[Ibid. L. 69.].

On June 24, the acting head of the department of the Artillery Academy N. P. Beresnev believed that "Germany is an advanced nation, the German National Socialist Party must win and it will win because the German army and the National Socialists bring advanced culture to the people" [Ibid. L. 41.]. According to Lieutenant Tarasov, commander of the radio company of the Northern Front, "From the first days of fighting with the Germans, it is clear that our units do not have much success and it turns out like "Hurrah, they are beating us"" [Ibid. L. 58.].

On June 25-26, Major General Skvortsov, a teacher of tactics at the Quartermaster Academy, believed that "the breakthrough of tanks to Oshmyany says a lot. Weakly, obviously, we have leadership. We have a colossal number of tanks, but we do not know how to use them. We also have no air superiority over the Germans. I think the situation at the front is very unfavorable for us. The Germans have had some success. They can land troops in the forests of Belarus unnoticed by us and strike from the rear" [Ibid. L. 50.]. According to Kurochkin, a cadet of the Kharkov Military Aviation Technical School, "the Germans started a war with us early. We are currently re-equipping aviation with new materiel. The flight crew has not yet flown these aircraft even once and is not prepared for air combat on these aircraft" [Ibid. L. 51.].

On June 26, an employee of the Personnel Department of the Red Army, Captain Malofeev, believed that "there will be a big fight, but we are still rather weak in the field of technology. The mechanized corps is not equipped with materiel, and there are many fools in the Red Army. In addition, the Germans flew along the Berlin-Moscow air route and back. It was their intelligence. The Germans knew that we had an air division in Bialystok, which the air cannot rise because the airfield was completely plowed" [Ibid. L. 21.]. As the Red Army soldier of the service company of the 2nd Regiment of the VNOS of the 2nd Air Defense Corps Zaitsev believed, "Hitler will free him from the Jewish dominance. In Germany, all the Jews were killed, now they will kill us too. Our leaders are now finished and they cannot escape anywhere, everywhere there is a capitalist encirclement. The people are hungry, there is nothing to eat in the village until the next harvest, and the government sent grain and oil to Germany and Finland" [Ibid. L. 75.]. According to the engineer of the UVS of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, engineer 1st rank Chuvilenkov, "the German offensive is in full contact with England, with the aim of completely destroying the USSR and establishing a single capitalist system. The defeat of the USSR in this war is inevitable, and soon the USSR will be forced to make Sverdlovsk its capital" [Ibid. L. 78.]. The brigade quartermaster of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, Gemizov, believed that "now it is difficult to decide which side will win, it must be taken into account that the German army is more organized, repeatedly fired upon and, moreover, has more experience in the war than the Red Army" [Ibid. . L. 82.]. According to the deputy head of the department of the Main Military Engineering Directorate Briginten-Dant Zaitsev, "Hitler entangled ours. We gave Hitler the opportunity to fulfill his dreams, first to defeat France, and then the Soviet Union. Where can we, with our lack of organization, fight the Germans. If we keep the Germans, then only with our gross strength. As a student of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization, junior military engineer Miroshnichenko, believed, "our aviation industry produces few aircraft, either it's America. There, one plant a month produces up to 1,500 aircraft, and if America does not help us, then we will not be able to cope with the Germans. And our planes are worse than American ones. In fact, the technique of the Red Army is worse than the German one, and now the outcome of the battle is decided by the technique

On June 26, a plan was prepared at the Main Artillery Directorate of the NPO to send machine guns for the fortified areas to Sebezh and the LVO from Poltava and other places.

On this occasion, Captain Krutikov said: "It turns out that the second defensive line without machine guns is empty, and Hitler is approaching the old border. While the machine guns are coming, the URs will be busy. Five days have passed, and the General Staff did not think about it. They remembered the second fortified line when the threat loomed. If the General Staff has such a large apparatus as in the GAU, and it works the same way, then we will lose the war. Hitler was taken by surprise. We were unprepared. In vain they gave Finland bread, Hitler - fuel and bread, and now they are beating us with our fuel." According to an employee of the Mobilization Department, Lieutenant Colonel Rodionov, "our people overslept, the enemy is cunning, he even took into account all the little things. He started the war on Sunday with the expectation of taking by surprise, since the command staff rested that day. Our command knew that the enemy was concentrating troops on our border, but they reacted complacently. This carelessness led to the fact that our units began to withdraw. In the country we had a lot of hype, but little action. Mobilization has begun, and in some military districts there are no uniforms (PribOVO). The planes don't have enough bombs. The question is, what was our command preparing for" [Ibid. L. 96 - 97.]. As the head of the 3rd department of the Military Topographic Directorate of the General Staff, Major Bodalin, believed, "and the Germans were ahead of us in deploying troops and their success, apparently, creates morale in Germany. They have a lot of aircraft and, probably, air superiority in relation to us. Moreover, they use the entire military industry of the occupied countries. [Ibid. L. 97 - 98.].

On June 28, Tarasov, an employee of the NPO car depot, believed that "if our troops defend themselves as they do now, then Hitler will probably defeat us." According to the worker Semyonov, "Hitler is a fine fellow - he knows how to fight, he knows tactics, but we were left in the cold, ours clap their ears and that is why the German troops advance so quickly and beat the Red Army. The situation is especially bad with aviation, because our aviation is much worse than the German one. As the driver Makarov believed, "Hitler knows how to fight well, the Germans know their business, are technically literate and will win. Look, ours and the Finns laid down a lot of people, and the Germans took the Maginot line without loss. The command of the Red Army is thinking of taking it with a bang, but this time has passed, the Germans are not afraid of a bang, we need equipment, skill, but we don't have this" [Ibid. L. 32 - 33.]. According to the lecturer of the Department of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, Colonel I. M. Snezhkov, "Hitler does not set himself the goal of overthrowing Soviet power, but pursues only the goal of reaching the line of the Dnieper River or some other line and will offer us peace at a profitable conditions for yourself. Hitler in his declaration calls the war with the Soviet Union a war of liberation, a war for the liberation of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia" [Ibid. L. 41 - 42.].

On June 29, the head of the 3rd department of the UPS of the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army, Chuvilenkov, believed that "the war with Germany is called a Patriotic War incorrectly. Patriotic war can be called such a war, for the conduct of which the whole people rises, without distinction of classes, estates and status. There are quite a few defeatists in the Soviet-German war" [Ibid. L. 28.]. According to a student of the 2nd year of the Military Veterinary Academy Kanishchev, "before the start of the war with Germany, they spoke everywhere and now they say that our Red Army is invincible, but in fact, according to the results of the first battles, it is clear that the Red Army is retreating. Obviously, our army is inferior in strength to the German one. The slogan of waging war on the territory of the enemy is also not confirmed, since the battles with the Germans are not taking place on the territory of Germany, but on our territory" [Ibid. L. 71.].

On June 30, Piskarev, engineer of the Energy Department of the Main Military Construction Directorate of the Red Army, believed that "it is easy to engage in campaigning for the victory of the Soviet Union, but the bad thing is that the Soviet Union was not prepared for war. Germany began to advance with impunity, taking one city after another without meeting resistance. If this continues, the USSR may be defeated and will be forced to



agree to any peace conditions. Germany has already shown its strength throughout the war with France and other countries, and now with the Soviet Union" [Ibid. L. 28 - 29.].

On July 1, Major General Pavlovich from the 1st Sverdlovsk Infantry School believed that "since we are talking about the Berezina, it means that the fortifications have been passed by the Germans ... now there is a plain all the way to Leningrad ... not a single obstacle. The question is about the people's militia, which means that the regular army has suffered quite a lot. Now we need to think not about rebuffing the Germans, but about whether the armies of the Southern Group will be able to get out of the bag into which they fell in the Lvov region" [Ibid. D. 100. L. 30.]. According to N. V. Gorbunov, a Red Army soldier from the same school, "the figures on the losses of the enemy are inflated, where can we take into account when our troops are all retreating, and the enemy is advancing" [Ibid. L. 31.].

On July 5, Lieutenant Colonel Belai (16th Army, Western Front) believed that "our command concluded an agreement with Germany and calmed down on this, they began to hold rallies, they were not engaged in forging the army. Most attention was paid to the introduction of a new form, as a result of which we were unprepared for defense. The Germans are squeezing us, no doubt, we will have many deserters and our young people, who are not very reliable and not capable of combat, will try to evade the war, will start deserting, chopping their fingers and looking for a way out. We are accustomed to only shouting in a peaceful environment, but now it turned out to be only stupidity and there is no order" [Ibid. D. 99. L. 266.].

On July 8, Colonel Kovardin, an employee of the Department of Military Educational Institutions of the NPO, believed that "the Germans are pushing our army. We must do justice: the Germans have a well-organized army apparatus, not that we and we need to learn from them in this regard" [Ibid. L. 244.]. According to an employee of the Combat Training Directorate, Colonel Vishnyakov, that "ours missed the deployment, we had to prepare for this earlier, but now it's not known what will happen ... The German army is well organized, discipline is much stronger, the troops have extensive experience in combat operations, and organization command and control is set high. The presence of these facts makes it possible for the German troops to move into our territory" [Ibid. L. 244 - 245.].

On July 11, Major General of Artillery Vnukov believed that "the Red Army is being beaten hard. There are no actual data on losses in the summaries. Knowing the organization during the Finnish campaign, I can imagine what is happening now and how our people are being beaten. The further advance of the Germans is obvious and, perhaps, a repetition of 1812 awaits Moscow" [Ibid. L. 251.].

On July 13, a lecturer in the Propaganda Department of the Political Propaganda Department of the Southwestern Front, senior political instructor Telichko (a member of the CPSU (b)) believed that "we are retreating because our generals are mediocre commanders, so they cannot organize a rebuff and plan a blow to the enemy. I'm amazed by this. The Germans are more enterprising and cunning." According to Captain Khimochkin, deputy head of the department for pontoon troops, "our retreat is nothing but the work of traitors and, of course, traitors from among high military ranks. This is confirmed by the fact that on the first day of the war our units fought with shovels, without weapons" [Ibid. D. 100. L. 91 - 92.].

On July 8, the head of the Political Propaganda Department of the 28th Panzer Division of the North-Western Front, battalion commissar Tretyakov, believed that "our brave generals in peacetime, in wartime turned into wet chickens, were confused and caused panic in units. An example is the deputy commander of the front, Lieutenant General Safronov. The enemy was still in Ionishki, and we were retreating from Riga, and when asked why we were retreating, he answered: "The German is near Mitava, we must save the army, withdraw and blow up the bridges, preventing him from further advance." According to the commander of the 28th Panzer Division, Colonel Chernyakhovsky, "it seems to me that Moscow does not know about the actual situation at the front and about the quantitative composition of the enemy. During the fighting, I did not see the enemy well-formed

units, they did not put up strong forces in any place, but they throw out separate groups, and if they are given a fight, they run and go where there are no troops. Since July 2, our division has been retreating. So you can retreat to Moscow. I declare with all responsibility that if they gave me a complete division and left those troops that are in the area of \u200b\u200bOstrov and Pskov, I would drive the enemy out of our borders and further within two days. As the assistant chief of the 2nd part of the headquarters of the 28th Panzer Division, Captain Kozlov, pointed out, "among the Red Army, when you tell them about the retreat, there is mass discontent and you literally have to be pulled out of the trenches, people want to fight, and orders to retreat" [Ibid. L. 138 - 139.].

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Thus, military counterintelligence documents testify to the presence of a whole range of reasons for the failures of the Soviet armed forces in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The most frequently reported problem of the troops in the documents was the lack of organization and confusion that existed in the army even in peacetime, but which became a serious obstacle to organized actions with the outbreak of war. This was greatly facilitated by the panic and confusion of a certain part of the personnel, which arose as a result of both a sudden attack by the enemy and unsuccessful military operations of their units in the first days of the war. It can be assumed that at that time most of the personnel of the Active Army experienced a psychological breakdown, associated both with the transition from civilian life to war, and with a clear divergence of the image of war formed in the minds of Soviet people on the eve of June 22, 1941, and the realities of combat actions. Having no experience in fighting an equivalent enemy, the Soviet troops had neither psychological nor practical skills to operate in a dynamic, rapidly changing environment, in conditions of a breakthrough by the enemy, encirclement and retreats. All this was superimposed on such a stereotype of public consciousness as disbelief in one's own strength. If in peacetime this feature of public sentiment manifested itself only in conversations, then during the war it became a breeding ground for the spread of panic and instability of the troops. In fact, the troops of the army, unexpectedly involved in hostilities, experienced an acute state of shock, in which any most fantastic rumors and assumptions were almost immediately perceived as reliable facts, influencing the behavior of large masses of people.

Another striking fact is the poor professional training of a certain part of the command staff of the Red Army. This became another cause of confusion, instability and panic among the troops. Unable to organize their subordinates to carry out combat missions, such commanders only pushed the fighters to believe in the deliberate failure of any of their own actions. Of course, the above excerpts from military counterintelligence documents do not make it possible to give any quantitative assessments of such negative phenomena, but they fully allow us to state that in the initial period of the war, the Red Army was clearly not a well-functioning military tool, ready to fulfill any order of the High Command. The unorganized entry into battle, the lack of reconnaissance, communications and control of formations, units and subunits, as well as the supply and interaction of troops on the battlefield, all this, in fact, turned the Army in large part into an armed crowd, unable to put up a serious rebuff to the enemy. Naturally, in such a situation, sentiments about readiness for surrender became noticeably widespread. Of course, this does not mean that, for the most part, Soviet military personnel dreamed of surrendering, but in a situation where the start of the war was unsuccessful for the Red Army, when the shock of the transition from a peaceful

life to military life and from defeats on the fronts became a breeding ground for such sentiments, the unstable fighter saw a way out of the situation in surrender or desertion. It is no coincidence that by July 20, 1941, 103,876 people were detained by operational barriers and barrage detachments, who for one reason or another "lost" their units, most of whom were again sent to the front. From July 20 to July 26, another 25,355 people were detained, of which 1,189 were arrested for espionage, cowardice, desertion and disorganization of the front, and 505 were shot [Ibid. L. 312 - 313.]. By July 31, German troops had captured 814,030 Soviet troops [**Schustereit H.** Vabanque: Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941 als

Versuch, durch den Sieg im Osten den Westen zu bezwingen. Bonn. 1988. S.73.].

It is clear that under these conditions, the successful actions of individual military formations of the Red Army were not linked into a single system and did not have a noticeable effect on the situation at the front. However, thanks to them, the enemy suffered more and more serious losses, which in the future led to the creation of conditions for the disruption of the German "blitzkrieg". Of course, for contemporaries and participants in those distant events, this result was by no means obvious. Unfortunately, the combat operations of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the war did not have a noticeable effect on the implementation of the plans of the German command. By the end of July 9, the German troops were successfully developing the offensive according to the Barbarossa plan. Army Group North advanced 450

500 km to Central Estonia and went to the front Pskov - Ostrov - Opochka - Sebezh. The troops of the Army Group "Center" went to the front Polotsk - Vitebsk - Orsha - Zhlobin, advancing 450 - 600 km. On the Southwestern Front, on July 1, Soviet troops began to withdraw to the line of the old fortified areas, but units of the 1st enemy tank group managed to overcome these fortifications before they were occupied by Soviet units. By July 9, Army Group South in Western Ukraine had advanced 300-350 km. The losses of the parties in the initial period of the war are shown in table 1.

**Table 1**

**Losses of the parties by June 10, 1941**

[**Yazov D.T.** There was a war ahead // Military History Journal. 1991. No. 5. S. 14; Classification Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Actions and Military Conflicts: A Statistical Study. M., 1993. S. 368; Strategic essay on the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). M., 1961. S. 190 - 191; **Schustereit H.** Vabanque. S. 70, 82-83; Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Bd.4. S.974; **Groehler O.** Starke, Verteilung und Verliiste derdeutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg// Militargeschichte. 1978. No. 3. S.331.]

	Red Army	Wehrmacht
Personnel	815 700	79 058
Guns and mortars	21500	1061
tanks	11783	350
Aircraft	4013	826

Nevertheless, despite the losses and defeats of the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army was not defeated at all. Contrary to the expectations of the German leadership, and indeed of most outside observers, it turned out that the actions of the Soviet armed forces were gradually becoming more organized and purposeful. This gave the most important thing at that moment - gaining time, which in turn allowed the Soviet military-political leadership to more fully use the military-industrial potential and mobilization capabilities of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Red Army in 1941 managed to accomplish what none of the opponents of the Third Reich had been able to do before - to hold the front and turn the war into a protracted one, which Germany could not win under those conditions.

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